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The U.S. Constitution is old, relatively brief, and very difficult to amend.  In its original 
form, the Constitution was primarily a framework for a new national government, and for 230 
years the national government has operated under that framework even as conditions have 
changed in ways beyond the Founders’ conceivable imaginations.  The framework has survived 
in no small part because government institutions have themselves played an important role in 
helping to fill in and clarify the framework through their practices and interactions, informed 
by the realities of governance.  Courts, the political branches, and academic commentators 
commonly give weight to such post-Founding governmental practice in discerning the 
Constitution’s separation of powers.  That approach has been referred to as the “historical 
gloss” method of constitutional interpretation, based on language that Justice Frankfurter used 
to describe the concept in his concurrence in the Youngstown steel seizure case.  Some 
originalist commentators, however, have advanced a potentially competing approach to 
crediting post-Founding practice, which they refer to as “liquidation,” an idea that they ascribe 
to James Madison and certain other members of the Founding generation.   
To date, there has not been any systematic effort to compare gloss and liquidation, even 
though the differences between them bear on the constitutionality of a range of governmental 
practices relating to both domestic and foreign affairs in the fields of constitutional law and 
federal courts.  This Article fills that gap in the literature.  We first provide an account of what 
must be shown in order to establish historical gloss.  Our account focuses on longstanding 
governmental practices that have proven to be stable—that is, practices that have operated for 
a significant amount of time without generating continued inter-branch contestation.  We then 
consider the extent to which the liquidation concept differs from that of gloss and whether those 
differences render liquidation more or less normatively attractive than gloss.  We argue that a 
narrow account of liquidation, such as the one offered by Professor Caleb Nelson, most clearly 
distinguishes liquidation from gloss, but that it does so in ways that are normatively 
problematic.  We further argue that a broader account of liquidation, as recently offered by 
Professor William Baude, responds to those normative concerns by diminishing the distinction 
between liquidation and gloss, but that significant differences remain that continue to raise 
normative problems for liquidation.  Finally, we question whether either account of liquidation 
is properly attributed to Madison. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In discerning the Constitution’s separation of powers, it is common for courts, the 
political branches, and academic commentators to give weight to post-Founding governmental 
practice.1  Reliance on such practice is sometimes referred to as the “historical gloss” method 
of constitutional interpretation, based on the way that Justice Frankfurter described the concept 
in his concurrence in the Youngstown steel seizure case.  In that decision, the Supreme Court 
held that President Truman had exceeded his constitutional authority in attempting to seize the 
nation’s steel mills during the Korean War to avert a strike.2  Frankfurter wrote separately to 
consider whether and to what extent historical practice might support Truman’s authority to 
seize the mills.3   
Frankfurter argued that historic governmental practice was relevant to the question of 
the President’s seizure authority, asserting that “[i]t is an inadmissibly narrow conception of 
American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the 
gloss which life has written upon them.”4  In his view, although “deeply embedded traditional 
ways of conducting government” could not “supplant the Constitution or legislation,” they 
could “give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”5   Frankfurter reviewed the 
historical practice concerning executive seizure of property, however, and found it insufficient 
to sustain Truman’s action.  Finding only three instances of presidential seizures comparable to 
the one at issue in the case, all of which occurred in 1941, Frankfurter concluded that “these 
three isolated instances do not add up, either in number, scope, duration or contemporaneous 
legal justification, to the kind of executive construction of the Constitution [that we have 
previously credited],” “[n]or do they come to us sanctioned by long-continued acquiescence of 
Congress giving decisive weight to a construction by the Executive of its powers.”6 
 The Supreme Court’s reliance on historical practice in discerning the separation of 
powers long predates Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown.  For example, in a 1915 case, 
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., the Court rejected a challenge to President Taft’s decision to 
temporarily withdraw certain public lands from private development, emphasizing the “long 
continued practice [of making] orders like the one here involved.”7  Along similar lines, the 
Court in the 1920s, in concluding that the President’s pardon power extends to a conviction for 
contempt of court, reasoned that “long practice under the pardoning power and acquiescence in 
it strongly sustains the construction it is based on.”8  And, in another decision from that period, 
the Court emphasized longstanding presidential practice when considering the circumstances 
                                               
1 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012). 
2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
3 Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
4 Id. at 610. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 613. 
7 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915). 
8 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118–19 (1925). 
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under which the President’s “pocket veto” (that is, failure to sign a bill before Congress 
recesses) should be deemed to operate.9 
 A number of the Supreme Court’s modern separation of powers decisions have also 
relied heavily on historical practice.  In 1981, in Dames & Moore v. Reagan, the Court upheld 
executive orders transferring billions of dollars in claims to an international tribunal in The 
Hague, as part of the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis, in large part based on the historical 
practice of presidential settlement of claims.10  In doing so, the Court expressly invoked Justice 
Frankfurter’s discussion of historical gloss.11  Two more recent decisions have particularly 
emphasized the importance of historical practice.  In 2014, the Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning 
relied heavily on historical practice in construing the scope of the President’s authority to make 
recess appointments.12  The Court explained that, because “the interpretive questions before us 
concern the allocation of power between two elected branches of Government,” it was 
appropriate to “put significant weight upon historical practice.”13   The following year, in 
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court again emphasized historical practice, this time in concluding that 
the President has an exclusive authority to recognize foreign governments and their territories 
that cannot be limited by Congress.14 
 Reliance on historical practice has also long been a staple of constitutional reasoning 
within the executive branch.  To take one of many examples, executive branch lawyers rely 
extensively on practice in discerning the scope of the President’s constitutional authority to use 
military force.  In 2018, for instance, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
concluded, based largely on historical practice, that President Trump had the power to direct 
airstrikes against Syria in response to its use of chemical weapons during the civil war there.  
Citing to earlier opinions from the Office, including one from 1970, OLC explained:  “We have 
recognized that ‘[s]ince judicial precedents are virtually non-existent’ in defining the scope of 
the President’s war powers, ‘the question is one which of necessity must be decided by 
historical practice.’”15  Similarly, in 2011 OLC concluded, based largely on historical practice, 
that President Obama had the constitutional authority to direct U.S. military forces to take part 
                                               
9  The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established practice is a 
consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this character.”). 
10 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
11 See id. at 684. 
12 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, 
Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (analyzing the role of historical 
practice in the opinions in Noel Canning). 
13 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559 (emphasis omitted). 
14 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015) (quoting Noel Canning for the proposition that “[i]n separation-of-powers 
cases this Court has often ‘put significant weight upon historical practice’”). 
15 Memorandum from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the 
Counsel for the President, April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities 5 (May 31, 2018), 
at https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1067551/download (quoting Presidential Authority to Permit Incursion 
Into Communist Sanctuaries in the Cambodia-Vietnam Border Area, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 313, 317 (May 14, 1970) 
(“Vietnam Border Area”)). 
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in bombing operations in Libya without first seeking congressional authorization.16  Quoting 
from an earlier legal opinion concerning a military intervention in Haiti, OLC asserted that “the 
pattern of executive conduct, made under claim of right, extended over many decades and 
engaged in by Presidents of both parties, evidences the existence of broad constitutional 
power.”17   
 Despite the prevalence of that sort of constitutional reasoning in the judiciary and the 
executive branch, until recently few academic commentators had given significant attention to 
it, or to its relationship to other approaches to constitutional interpretation.  That started to 
change in 2012, when one of us co-authored an article exploring those questions.18  The Noel 
Canning decision two years later further heightened interest in the relevance of historical 
practice to the separation of powers.  Since then, a number of commentators, including the two 
of us, have continued to try to unpack the concept of historical gloss.19 
Some originalist commentators have invoked a different term to describe the relevance 
of post-Founding practice to constitutional interpretation: “liquidation.”  Drawing on references 
to that term by James Madison and certain other members of the Founding generation, those 
commentators have outlined the conditions under which post-Founding practice can potentially 
“liquidate” indeterminate constitutional meaning such that it becomes “fixed.”20  The Supreme 
Court, too, has sometimes invoked the idea of “fixing” constitutional meaning when referring 
to the relevance of historical practice to constitutional interpretation.21  The word “liquidation” 
is used in that context to mean essentially the opposite of the principal modern connotation of 
                                               
16 See Memorandum Opinion from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen, Office of 
Legal Counsel, to the Att’y Gen, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya (Apr 1, 2011), at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf.   
17 Id. at 7. 
18 See generally Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1. 
19 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and 
the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255 (2017); Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
59 (2017); Bradley & Siegel, supra note 12. 
20 In referring to “indeterminacy” in this Article, we are using it as a shorthand to encompass a range of 
circumstances in which the meaning of the constitutional text is under-determinate, including instances of 
ambiguity, vagueness, gaps, and contradictions.  See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional 
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 469–70 (2013). 
21 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (“[A] contemporaneous legislative exposition 
of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively 
participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given its 
provisions.”); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to Congress’s 
requirement that Supreme Court Justices sit on circuit courts, explaining that “practice and acquiescence under it 
for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, afford an irresistible answer 
and have indeed fixed the construction”). 
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the word; instead of signifying dissolution (as in a “liquidation sale”), it is used to signify 
solidification or determination (as in “liquidated damages”).22 
In part because the concepts of gloss and liquidation have only recently begun to receive 
sustained academic attention, it is not entirely clear whether and to what extent they do or should 
differ from one another.  In Noel Canning, the Court seemed to assume that liquidation and 
gloss were the same phenomenon.  After quoting a reference to liquidation by Madison, the 
Court wrote that “our cases have continually confirmed Madison’s view.”23  In its string cite of 
decisions, however, the Court included a number of decisions claimed by supporters of the gloss 
approach, including Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown.24  Legal scholars also appear 
confused about the distinction, if any, between gloss and liquidation.  Writing a year after Noel 
Canning, Professor Richard Fallon expressed uncertainty, describing gloss as “closely related” 
to liquidation but “possibly more capacious.”25 
Although originalists often focus on history, usually it is history relating to the 
constitutional Founding and the pre-Founding period.26  Perhaps because of that, until recently 
the only scholar to have extensively addressed liquidation was Professor Caleb Nelson, who 
described it in fairly narrow terms.27  In a new article, however, Professor William Baude has 
offered a broader account of the concept.28  Meanwhile, the historian Jonathan Gienapp has 
published an important study of how, over the course of the 1790s, Madison and others in the 
                                               
22 The word “liquidate” derives from the Late Latin “liquidare,” one meaning of which was “to make 
clear or plain (something obscure or confused); to render unambiguous; to settle (differences, disputes).”  8 THE 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1012 (2d ed. 1989). 
23 134 S. Ct. at 2560. 
24 See id. (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654, 686 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J, 
concurring); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689–90 (1929); Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118–19 
(1925); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472–74 (1915); McPherson v Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 
(1892); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); and Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 
(1803)). 
25 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1753, 1775 (2015).  See also Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial 
Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 541 & n.424 (2018) (discussing “gloss” and stating that “[i]n a somewhat 
similar vein, Caleb Nelson and William Baude have suggested that political practice can ‘liquidate’ (that is, settle) 
the meaning of ‘contestable’ constitutional provisions”) (emphasis added). 
26 See Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 655–57 
(2013) (describing how originalism has traditionally focused on history relating to the adoption of the Constitution 
and its amendments). 
27 Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525–53 (2003) 
[hereinafter “Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions”]; Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably 
Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 10–21 (2001). 
28 William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
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Founding generation changed their understanding of the nature of the Constitution, including 
its relationship to historical practice.29 
In this Article, we consider whether and to what extent the concept of liquidation, in 
either the narrow form developed by Nelson or the broader form developed by Baude, differs 
from that of gloss.  We also consider whether, to the extent there are differences between 
liquidation and gloss, those differences render liquidation more or less normatively attractive 
than gloss.  We argue that Nelson’s narrow account of liquidation most clearly distinguishes 
liquidation from gloss, but that it does so in ways that are normatively problematic.  We then 
argue that Baude’s broader account of liquidation responds to those normative concerns by 
diminishing the distinction between liquidation and gloss, but that significant differences 
remain that continue to raise normative problems for liquidation.  Finally, we question whether 
either scholar’s account of liquidation is properly attributed to Madison. 
The differences between gloss and liquidation matter.  In part because of recent judicial 
appointments to both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, originalism may be 
experiencing a resurgence.  At the same time, originalist theory has become more receptive to 
accommodating various non-originalist materials, including historical practice.  Unlike the 
changes in originalist theory over the years—from a focus on the intentions of the Framers, to 
the understandings of the ratifiers, to the original public meaning of the constitutional text—
and unlike the originalist embrace of judicial precedent and the idea of “constitutional 
construction,”30 originalist efforts to claim a greater role for historical practice as within the 
originalist project have not yet received much attention or recognition as such.  Like those other 
“impurifications” of originalism, however, the originalist turn to practice presents originalists 
with difficult tradeoffs.31  As we will explain below, those tradeoffs vary depending on whether 
one opts for gloss or liquidation.  More concretely, the constitutionality of many important and 
longstanding governmental practices in the fields of both constitutional law and federal courts 
may depend on that choice.  Examples include the recess appointments practices accepted in 
Noel Canning; the extensive modern practice of using congressional-executive agreements in 
lieu of Senate-approved treaties; presidential authority to order small-scale or short-term uses 
of military force without congressional authorization; the authority of presidents to withdraw 
the United States from treaties; the longstanding practice of permitting non-Article III courts to 
adjudicate federal law cases subject to certain limitations; and the even longer practice of 
vesting less than the full Article III judicial power in the federal courts notwithstanding the 
ostensibly mandatory language of Article III.32 
Part I explains why attention to post-Founding historical practice fits more naturally 
with non-originalist theories of constitutional interpretation than with originalist theories, and 
                                               
29  See JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION:  FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE 
FOUNDING ERA (2018). 
30 See infra notes 42–49 and accompanying text. 
31 For analysis of the phenomenon of theory “working itself impure,” with originalism as one of several 
case studies, see generally Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory 
of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819 (2016). 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 50-51, 109–118. 
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it considers why some originalists are nevertheless paying increasing attention to practice.  Part 
II describes the historical gloss approach and explains why, under most accounts, it does not 
require evidence of an inter-branch agreement about the meaning of the Constitution.  It also 
argues that gloss is most defensible in the separation of powers context.  Part III assesses the 
extent to which the liquidation approach as developed respectively by Professors Nelson and 
Baude differs from gloss, and it argues both that there are differences and that those differences 
render liquidation normatively less attractive than gloss.  Part IV explains why it is doubtful 
that either Nelson’s or Baude’s version of the liquidation approach can properly be attributed 
to Madison.  Part V concludes by underscoring the importance of historical practice in light of 
the age, brevity, and difficulty of amending the Constitution. 
I.  THE ORIGINALIST TURN TO PRACTICE 
One of the central divisions in constitutional theory is between originalist and non-
originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation.  There are many versions of both 
originalism and non-originalism, but they each have certain core elements.  In particular, 
originalists tend to insist that the meaning of the Constitution became fixed at the time that its 
text was ratified and that interpreters are bound by that original meaning.  By contrast, non-
originalists tend to accept that constitutional meaning can change even absent formal 
amendments to the text and that it can be appropriate for interpreters to apply the changed 
meaning. 
Because non-originalist approaches accept that constitutional meaning can change over 
time, it is not difficult for them to accommodate post-Founding historical practice in 
constitutional interpretation.  Many non-originalists are “pluralist” in that they are willing to 
credit a range of materials, including history of various types.33  As Professor Eric Segall has 
noted, pluralists “argue that judges use well-recognized factors such as text, history, political 
practices, non-ratification era history, and evaluations of consequences to decide cases.”34  And 
pluralists further argue that it is appropriate for interpreters to use those multiple forms of 
constitutional authority. 
More specific non-originalist theories also tend to be compatible with looking to 
historical practice.  For example, reliance on historical practice fits well with Burkean 
approaches to constitutional interpretation, which emphasize longstanding traditions and 
                                               
33 See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (discussing six “modalities” of constitutional 
argumentation, including text, structure, history, precedent, consequences, and ethos); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (1987) 
(observing that, “[w]ith only a few dissenters, most judges, lawyers, and commentators recognize the relevance of 
at least five kinds of constitutional argument”); see also Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic 
Nonoriginalism and the Combinality Problem, 91 TEX. L REV. 1379, 1741 (2013) (attempting to set forth “a 
pluralistic nonoriginalist conception of constitutional law that is clear and plausible enough to provide a focal point 
for debates about constitutional interpretation”). 
34 Eric Segall, Is Originalism a Theory?, DORF ON LAW (Nov. 14, 2018), at http://www.dorfonlaw.org/ 
2018/11/is-originalism-theory.html; see also Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 
TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1753 (1994) (“Pluralistic theories of constitutional interpretation hold that there are multiple 
legitimate methods of interpreting the Constitution.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331588 
 8 
understandings.35  It also fits well with the somewhat related idea—most extensively developed 
and defended by Professor David Strauss—of “common law constitutionalism,” which involves 
an incremental interpretation of the Constitution in light of both judicial precedent and 
tradition. 36   Arguments based on historical practice also overlap with non-originalist 
approaches that emphasize particularly decisive moments in history, such as Professor Bruce 
Ackerman’s theory of constitutional “moments.”37 
Non-originalists may be receptive to considering post-Founding historical practice in 
part because doing so can help address one of the principal objections to non-originalism.  
Nearly sixty years ago, Professor Alexander Bickel coined the term “the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty” to describe the democratic problem that exists when unelected judges use the power 
of judicial review to tell popular majorities that they cannot govern as they wish.38  If the judges 
are relying on materials external to their own will, such as historical political branch practice, 
their decisions may be less counter-majoritarian, especially if the materials themselves have 
democratic elements.39  Moreover, the counter-majoritarian difficulty is especially acute when 
courts seek to overturn longstanding practices accepted and relied upon by both coordinate 
branches of the government, which may justify particular judicial deference to such practices 
in constitutional interpretation.40 
In contrast to the general receptivity of non-originalism towards post-Founding 
historical practice, such practice is not a natural fit for originalism.  Originalists tends to insist 
on what has been called the “fixation thesis,” which provides that the communicative content 
of the Constitution became fixed when the text of the Constitution was ratified.41  To be sure, 
variants of “new originalism,” which emphasize the idea of “constitutional  construction” as an 
enterprise distinct from constitutional interpretation, appear to allow some role for post-
                                               
35 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006); Ernest Young, 
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 
664 (1994). 
36 See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); David A. Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).  
37 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
38 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 18 (1962). 
39 Of course, it cannot simply be assumed that political branch practice is majoritarian, especially given 
the many undemocratic institutions and practices within the political branches.  See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, 
OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN 
CORRECT IT) (2006); PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 147–51 (6th ed. 2015); Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEORGETOWN L.J. 
113, 144–157 (2012).  But the political branches are still generally regarded as more majoritarian than the judiciary. 
40 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 428–29, 434. 
41 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015); see also Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
599, 599 (2004) (“Originalism regards the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial 
adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.”). 
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Founding practice to help determine the Constitution’s legal effect.42  But the concept of 
construction is controversial among originalists, 43  and the proper dividing line between 
interpretation and construction is contested and uncertain.44  Moreover, depending on how it is 
applied, the construction concept has the potential to undercut another common tenet of 
originalism—the “constraint principle,” whereby “the communicative content of the 
Constitution should constrain constitutional practice, including decisions by courts and the 
actions of officials such as the President and institutions such as Congress.”45  Indeed, as 
Professor Jack Balkin’s work illustrates, if the construction concept is applied broadly, it may 
largely collapse the distinction between originalism and non-originalism.46  Anxiety about the 
potential breadth of the construction zone has recently moved one prominent originalist, 
Professor Randy Barnett, to propose resorting exclusively to the original purposes or spirit of 
constitutional provisions when operating within that zone,47 a type of consideration that is 
typically anathema to formalists in matters of interpretation and so may not reassure other 
originalists.48  For those reasons, some originalists may be prone to reject any consideration of 
post-Founding historical practice as in effect allowing for constitutional change without a 
formal textual amendment.49 
                                               
42  See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:  DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 
65 (2011); Solum, supra note 20; Whittington, supra note 41, at 611–12. 
43 For a critique, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New 
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009); see also Solum, 
supra note 41, at 5 (“Both the interpretation-construction distinction and the construction zone are controversial.”).  
44 See Laura A. Cisneros, The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction Distinction:  A Useful Fiction, 
27 CONST. COMM. 71, 75 (2010) (“No one has developed a formula for predictably discerning between the two 
activities and it is doubtful that such a formula, if devised and presented, would win more than minority support 
among constitutional scholars.”); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the 
Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1269 (2015) (“It is not clear that all of these theorists have precisely the 
same concepts in mind when they make this distinction [between interpretation and construction].”). 
45 Solum, supra note 41, at 8. 
46 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011) (arguing for “framework originalism, which views 
the Constitution as an initial framework for governance that sets politics in motion, and that Americans must fill 
out over time through constitutional construction”).  For an argument that Balkin’s approach largely collapses the 
distinction between originalism and non-originalism, see Neil S. Siegel, Jack Balkin’s Rich Historicism and Diet 
Originalism: Health Benefits and Risks for the Constitutional System, 111 MICH. L. REV. 931 (2013) (book 
review); see also Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 
355 (2007) (noting that “many originalists will read Balkin to be a living constitutionalist in disguise—and may 
not let him into their club”). 
47 See Randy E. Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 
GEO. L.J. 1 (2018). 
48 See John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 
YALE L.J. 1663 (2004); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 
(2006).  
49 Cf. Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and NonOriginalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 710 
(2011) (“Given modern originalism’s origins as a response to the perceived excesses of non-originalism, it is not 
surprising that many originalists have resisted refinements to the theory that would tend to collapse the distinction 
between originalism and non-originalism.”). 
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A complete rejection of historical practice, however, leaves originalism vulnerable in a 
number of serious ways and thus helps explain why originalists are paying increasing attention 
to it.  First is the problem of where to go when the original meaning is unknown or unknowable.  
For some questions, there is little guidance in the constitutional text and no judicial precedent 
on point, in which case historical practice may provide the most objective material for making 
a decision.  Issues relating to the scope of executive power are a prime candidate for historical 
practice because of the sparse nature of the text of Article II of the Constitution and the 
substantially changed nature of the presidency over the course of American history.  To take 
one of many examples, although the text of the Constitution instructs how the United States is 
to enter into treaties (by presidents with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate),50 
it says nothing about how the United States is to terminate or withdraw from them, something 
that has instead been worked out (largely in favor of unilateral presidential authority) through 
practice.51 
A second problem for an originalism that rejects historical practice is the usual “dead 
hand” objection to being governed by the original meaning of a text that is both old and very 
difficult to amend.  Since the Founding, there have been dramatic changes in both the nature 
and needs of American governance, as well as dramatic changes in social values (not just 
changes in facts, which strict versions of originalism can accommodate).  As a result, it is not 
clear how the Constitution can retain its public legitimacy when interpreted only in accordance 
with a full-throated originalism.  To be sure, some prominent originalists—including Professor 
Baude and our colleague Stephen Sachs—seem to treat it as sign of originalism’s intellectual 
integrity that, “for better or worse,” it might not be possible to make the theory “safe for the 
modern world.”52  But for most people, it is not a selling point of an interpretive theory that it 
can cause great disruptions to the fabric of the law and potentially cause catastrophic social 
harm in the process.  As a result, most originalists, including those who wield judicial power, 
have in fact sought to make originalism relatively safe for most Americans living today.  
Consulting customary political branch practice may be one way to accomplish that task, as 
Baude himself appears to recognize.53 
A third objection to strict originalism is the charge that the theory is less consistent than 
non-originalism with how American constitutional law has actually operated and been 
understood throughout history—in other words, that originalism is mostly normative, not 
                                               
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
51 See Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773 (2014).  To 
address issues like that one, some originalists attempt to ground various executive powers in the Article II “vesting 
clause,” but there are serious questions about whether that interpretation is consistent with the original 
understanding of the clause, and only Justice Thomas on the current Supreme Court has embraced that 
interpretation.  See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2098–2101 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part); see also CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 167–69 (6th ed. 2017) (describing the academic debate concerning that issue). 
52 William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 103, 107 (2016); see also 
id. (“We come not to bring peace but a sword.”). 
53 See generally Baude, supra note 28. 
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genuinely our law as a positive matter.54  That is a problem for originalists who want to account 
for most of our constitutional practice, including the growth of the modern state over the course 
of the twentieth century and judicial decisions that are regarded as some of the greatest 
achievements of the Supreme Court.55   It is also a problem for the realism of originalist 
proposals to transform our constitutional practice.  Although there is a first time for everything, 
it seems unlikely that anything approaching strict originalism will ever become “our law” as 
applied, even with recent, originalism-friendly changes in the composition of the Supreme 
Court.  We do not expect the Court in the years ahead to revisit, say, the constitutionality of the 
administrative state as a general matter, the modern scope of presidential power (again, as a 
general matter), or the constitutionality of longstanding entitlement programs like social 
security.  Thus, to be realistic, originalism may need to take some account of historical 
practice.56 
Finally, many originalists are willing to accept judicial precedent interpreting the 
Constitution, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, even if the precedent is not consistent 
with the original understanding.  They do so either as a pragmatic exception to originalism,57 
or as a move that is ostensibly licensed by an original understanding of Article III.58  But 
important precedents are also established outside the courts.  As Professor Mitchell Berman has 
observed, “nonjudicial precedents have significantly shaped American politics and culture,” 
including many that have “never [been] subjected to legal challenge, hence never passed on by 
a federal court.”59  Many of the standard values associated with deference to judicial precedent 
also apply to nonjudicial precedent.60  For example, adherence to judicial precedent is said to 
                                               
54 For a provocative argument that originalism is our law as a positive matter, see generally William 
Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015).  For a response, see Richard Primus, Is 
Theocracy Our Politics?, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 44 (May 11, 2016).  In our view, Baude defines 
originalism so broadly that it loses much of its distinctiveness from non-originalism.  He also fails to appreciate 
that judicial speech can differ from judicial practice for reasons other than a judicial belief that the practice 
contravenes applicable legal norms.  For another effort to ground originalism in a positive account of American 
constitutional practice, see Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 817 (2015). 
55 For a powerful statement of that point, see BALKIN, supra note 46, at 31–34. 
56 Because of the disruptions it would cause, a shift to strict originalism would also create tensions with 
the rule of law and democratic legitimacy values that are often invoked in support of originalism.  Cf. Lawrence 
B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent:  A Public Meaning Approach, 33 CONST. COMM. 451, 461–63 (2018) 
(suggesting that, for rule of law and democratic legitimacy reasons, it might make sense for an originalist to accept 
non-originalist precedent during a transition towards more originalist decisionmaking in order to avoid undue 
disruption). 
57 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 140 (1997) 
(describing stare decisis as “not part of [his] originalist philosophy,” but as “a pragmatic exception to it”).   
58 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 803, 809–23 (2009). But see Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005).   
59 Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34 (2009). 
60 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 427–28; Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 713 (2008).  For a general discussion of some of the values served by stare decisis, see RANDY J. 
KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 36–49 (2017). 
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promote stability, consistency, and predictability in the law by protecting reliance interests.61  
Such interests, however, can presumably arise as a result of governmental practices as well as 
judicial decisions.  As a result, those originalists who view stare decisis as a pragmatic 
exception to originalism may have a hard time explaining why there should not also be a 
pragmatic exception for non-judicial precedent.  And originalists who view reliance on judicial 
precedent as part of the Article III judicial power may face difficulties explaining why reliance 
on historical practice is not also part of that power, even though the Supreme Court began 
consulting such practice very early in its history.62 
In short, there are a number of reasons why originalists might want to allow room for 
considering post-Founding historical practice in constitutional interpretation (or construction).  
At the same time, there is a serious risk that doing so will further collapse the distinction 
between originalism and non-originalism beyond what has been wrought by the attempts of 
many originalists to emphasize original meaning over original intent and to incorporate stare 
decisis.63 
In the balance of this Article, we analyze potentially competing approaches to 
incorporating post-Founding historical practice in constitutional interpretation.  In Part II, we 
consider the historical gloss approach, which tends to be favored by non-originalists.  In Parts 
III and IV, we turn to the liquidation approaches articulated by two originalist scholars, 
Professors Nelson and Baude.  
II.  THE HISTORICAL GLOSS APPROACH 
 There is no canonical account of the historical gloss approach to constitutional 
interpretation.  It is most commonly invoked in connection with issues relating to the separation 
of powers, and we explain below why it is most defensible in that context.  As the name “gloss” 
implies, it is not typically treated as a free-standing source of constitutional law.  Instead, it is 
used to help interpret other constitutional materials, most notably the constitutional text and 
structural inferences from the text, when those materials are thought to be unclear with respect 
to the constitutional question under consideration.64   
The gloss approach is most famously associated with Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence 
in Youngstown, but the idea was not original to him, and he invoked an earlier decision in 
                                               
61 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1992). 
62 See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (quoted supra note 21).   
63 See supra notes 42–49 and accompanying text (noting those changes over time in originalist theory); 
Kessler & Pozen, supra note 31, at 1844–47 (documenting the increasing “impurification” of originalism). 
64 That is one reason why it can be hazardous to analogize gloss to types of custom that do operate as 
freestanding law, such as customary international law.  For commentators who make that analogy, see, for 
example,  Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 
109, 134 (1984), and Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 675 (2016).   
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support of it.65  Moreover, Frankfurter described the approach as it applies to executive power 
in terms that, if strictly applied, would sharply limit its relevance: 
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of 
the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have 
also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power 
part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive 
Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.66 
In reality, neither courts nor other interpreters have required that a practice have “never before 
[been] questioned” before being credited as gloss, presumably because very few practices 
would qualify as gloss if subjected to such a demanding test.  Relatedly, such a test would mean 
that gloss would be of little help when it is most needed—that is, when there is a dispute over 
constitutional interpretation.67 
In this Part, we sketch the general contours of what we understand to be the gloss 
approach.  In doing so, we give particular weight to the Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel 
Canning,68 because it is not only recent but also represents the Court’s most sustained and self-
conscious consideration of the relevance of historical practice to the separation of powers.  As 
we explain, gloss is focused on longstanding governmental practices that have proven to be 
stable—that is, practices that have operated for a significant amount of time without generating 
continued inter-branch contestation.  After describing the core elements of gloss, we address 
two issues relating to gloss that—as will become apparent in Part III—are especially relevant 
when comparing gloss with liquidation:  first, whether gloss requires evidence of a 
constitutional agreement between the acting branch and the affected branch; and second, 
whether gloss applies outside the domain of separation of powers. 
A.  General Requirements for Gloss 
As illustrated by Noel Canning, there are at least three requirements for gloss:  
governmental practice, longstanding duration, and acquiescence, which we interpret below as 
requiring at least reasonable stability in the practice but not necessarily inter-branch 
constitutional agreement. 
First, gloss is focused on governmental practice—that is, the actions and inactions of 
government institutions, whether executive, legislative, or judicial.  It is not focused on 
                                               
65 See 343 U.S. at 611 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (relying on United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 
U.S. 459 (1915)). 
66 343 U.S. at 610–11. 
67 Unless context indicates otherwise, we use the term “interpretation” here and elsewhere in this Article 
in the informal way that it is used by judges and other non-specialists rather than in the more specialized way that 
it is used by some originalist commentators.  In other words, when referring to interpretation, we generally do not 
attempt to distinguish it from “construction.” 
68 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
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historical traditions or events in general, or on public or social attitudes.69  In addition, more 
weight is generally placed on the actual behavior of institutions than on their stated views, for 
the obvious reason that talk can be cheap in politics.  Nonetheless, governmental statements 
and reasoning are still relevant, because, among other things, they can provide insights into how 
participants in a practice understand the practice and its scope, and also because it can be 
evidence of reliance on a practice.  In Noel Canning, for example, the Court reviewed in detail 
both the history of presidential recess appointments and how the Senate responded to them, and 
it looked to executive branch memoranda in large part as confirmation that “upset[ting] this 
traditional practice . . . would seriously shrink the authority that Presidents have believed 
existed and have exercised for so long.”70 
Second, in order for the relevant practice to be credited, it must be of longstanding 
duration.  There is no magic number of years, but the case for gloss is strongest when the 
practice has continued over numerous presidential administrations and has enjoyed the support 
of both major political parties (because such practices are less likely to be the product of mere 
partisan politics).71  The practice need not, however, date to or near the Founding period, and 
modern practice can potentially qualify as gloss even if it differs from earlier practice.  In Noel 
Canning, the Court emphasized that, although “pre-Civil War history is not helpful”72  in 
resolving whether the President had the authority to make “intra-session” recess appointments, 
modern practice was sufficient to establish gloss: 
Since 1929, and particularly since the end of World War II, Congress has 
shortened its inter-session breaks as it has taken longer and more frequent intra-
session breaks; Presidents have correspondingly made more intra-session recess 
appointments. Indeed, if we include military appointments, Presidents have 
made thousands of intrasession recess appointments.73 
The Court explained that “three-quarters of a century of settled practice is long enough to entitle 
a practice to ‘great weight in a proper interpretation’ of the constitutional provision.”74 
Third, there must be acquiescence by the affected branch (for example, Congress in the 
case of an exercise of executive power), which means at least that the practice must have 
become reasonably stable over time.  As we explain further below in Section B, stability does 
                                               
69 Not all commentators seeking to critique gloss have appreciated that point.  See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, 
Historical Gloss:  A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 77 (2013) (wondering whether the relevant historical 
practice for purposes of gloss is “custom, tradition, prescription, or something else”). 
70 134 S. Ct. at 2573. 
71 There is also no magic number in terms of the frequency or density of the practice, characteristics that 
will vary depending on how often the issue tends to arise.  If the practice has been very infrequent, however, there 
may be questions about whether there is in fact a course of practice. 
72 Id. at 2561. 
73 Id. at 2562. 
74 Id. at 2564 (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 689).  By contrast, as noted in the Introduction, 
Justice Frankfurter concluded in Youngstown that three recent and isolated instances of presidential property 
seizure were insufficient to establish a gloss on executive power.  See supra text accompanying note 6. 
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not necessarily require that the relevant institutions have reached an agreement about the 
meaning of the Constitution, although if there is such an agreement the case for gloss is stronger 
because the likelihood of stability is higher.  Instead, the practice must have operated for a 
significant amount of time without generating continued inter-branch contestation.  Such 
stability might be confirmed by the inaction of an affected branch, even if such inaction does 
not necessarily show that there is a shared constitutional interpretation.75  In Noel Canning, for 
example, the Court emphasized that although the Senate had been hostile at times to recess 
appointments made to fill vacancies that predated the recess, “the Senate subsequently 
abandoned its hostility” and, in addressing issues relating to recess appointments in the 
twentieth century, the Senate had not argued that the presidential practice was 
unconstitutional.76  The fact that “[t]he Senate as a body has not countered this practice for 
nearly three quarters of a century, perhaps longer,”77 gave the practice enough stability to 
qualify as gloss.  
Because stability is required for gloss, one normative issue is the danger that it might 
unduly favor executive power over congressional authority because it is easier for the executive 
to engage in unilateral action, and it can be difficult for Congress as an institution to overcome 
collective action problems and contest such practice.78  That is an important concern, but it can 
potentially be addressed by embracing a broad conception of what counts as contestation—for 
example, extending it beyond the enactment of opposing statutes and including various forms 
of congressional “soft law,” such as committee reports and nonbinding resolutions.79  The Court 
in Noel Canning may have given a nudge to the consideration of such soft law in noting that 
“neither the Senate considered as a body nor its committees, despite opportunities to express 
opposition to the practice of intra-session recess appointments, has done so.”80   (Isolated 
objections from individual members of Congress, however, presumably would not qualify as 
continued inter-branch contestation of a practice.)   
To be clear, we are relying on Noel Canning here not because one should assume that 
the Supreme Court is necessarily right about how to implement a particular approach to 
constitutional interpretation.  Instead, we are relying on it to help illustrate the approach to gloss 
that we are independently defending and will use as a reference point when comparing gloss 
with liquidation.  Ultimately, the proper contours of an approach to gloss should depend on 
one’s normative justifications for relying on historical practice in constitutional interpretation, 
                                               
75 See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2094 (treating as relevant the lack of congressional regulation of 
recognition issues throughout much of the twentieth century without attempting to establish that this inaction was 
the result of a perception by Congress that it lacked constitutional authority to regulate). 
76 134 S. Ct. at 2572. 
77 Id. at 2573. 
78 See generally Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132 (1999).  
79 For discussions of congressional soft law, see Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 716 (2012), and Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 573 (2008). 
80 134 S. Ct. at 2563 (emphasis added).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331588 
 16 
a point that we take into account in the next two Sections as we further refine our account of 
gloss. 
We should also emphasize that our goal here is simply to outline the core elements of 
the gloss approach so that it can be compared with liquidation.  As a result, we do not purport 
to address all of the methodological issues that gloss may implicate.  For example, although we 
have mentioned the implications for stability of one branch’s inaction in the face of 
longstanding practice by another branch, we have not addressed the implications of inaction for 
the constitutional authority of the inactive branch, which often (although not inevitably) is 
Congress.  If a long period has passed in which one of the three federal branches has not engaged 
in a practice, to what extent does such inaction suggest that it lacks the constitutional authority 
to do so?  The Supreme Court has in recent times emphasized that sort of past inaction—that it, 
is has emphasized the novelty of an action now taken by a federal branch—when concluding 
that the action is unconstitutional on either separation of powers or federalism grounds.81  
Without attempting to resolve that issue here, we note that there can be a variety of reasons why 
action has not been taken before, including that there was not previously a perceived need for 
such action.82  For that and other reasons, if inaction is to be treated as evidence of a branch’s 
lack of constitutional authority to act, as opposed to evidence of acquiescence in another 
branch’s exercise of authority, it may make sense to apply a more stringent test than the one we 
are outlining here.83 
                                               
81 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015) (“‘[T]he most striking thing’ about the 
history of recognition ‘is what is absent from it: a situation like this one,’ where Congress has enacted a statute 
contrary to the President’s formal and considered statement concerning recognition.”) (quoting Zivotofsky v. 
Secretary of State, 725 F.3d 197, 221 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Tatel, J., concurring)); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010) (“Perhaps the most telling indication of the severe 
constitutional problem with the [Public Company Accounting Oversight Board] is the lack of historical precedent 
for this entity.” (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 561 U.S. 477)); 
Medellín v. Texas, 552 US. 491, 532 (2008) (emphasizing that the presidential action to compel Texas to comply 
with an international court’s decision was “unprecedented”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) 
(“[I]f . . . earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the 
power was thought not to exist.”). 
82 See generally Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407 (2017) (rejecting the 
Supreme Court’s recent assertions that the novelty of a federal statute indicates its inconsistency with constitutional 
principles of federalism or separation of powers).  See also Curtis A. Bradley, Historical Gloss, the Recognition 
Power, and Judicial Review, 109 AM J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 2 (2015) (doubting that the finding of a lack of 
congressional power in Zivotofsky was supported by historical gloss as opposed to structural and consequentialist 
considerations); Jack L. Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 112, 
122–23 (2015) (critiquing that aspect of the Court’s reasoning in Zivotofsky); Neil S. Siegel, Distinguishing the 
“Truly National” from the “Truly Local”: Customary Allocation, Commercial Activity, and Collective Action, 62 
DUKE L.J. 797, 814, 815 (2012) (identifying various possible reasons for congressional inaction and concluding 
that “courts are wrong to presume that the unprecedented nature of an exercise of federal power renders the exercise 
unconstitutional”); infra Part II.C.2 (similar); Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive and 
Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 WM. & MARY L REV. 535, 541, 591 (2016) 
(expressing concern about the use of historical gloss in Zivotofsky to disable Congress from legislating). 
83 See infra note 108 (suggesting one potential component of such a test).  Cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 
638 (Jackson, J., concurring) (suggesting that courts “scruitinize[] with caution” claims that Congress lacks the 
authority to regulate presidential action). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331588 
 17 
B.  Does Acquiescence Require Constitutional Agreement? 
It is sometimes suggested by commentators that the third requirement for gloss is more 
demanding than reasonable stability—in particular, that the affected branch must have agreed 
that the practice is constitutional.84   To understand why the third requirement is not best 
interpreted that way, it is useful to consider the principal justifications in support of relying 
upon historical practice as it relates to the separation of powers.  
 As one of us has previously outlined, a review of Supreme Court decisions and other 
materials suggests that there are at least three general sets of reasons for invoking gloss.85  One 
set of reasons concerns what can be called “Burkean consequentialism.”  The basic idea is that 
longstanding governmental practices are suggestive of what works well, or at least what works 
better than anything the courts are likely to impose.86  Such practices reflect the realities of 
governance and changes in the needs of governance, and therefore, the reasoning goes, they 
have the potential to embody collective wisdom.  Under that rationale, the very persistence of 
a practice is evidence of its utility, and deferring to it protects reliance interests, expectation 
interests, stability of governance, and settlement.87  The emphasis here is less on constitutional 
interpretation by political actors and more on the functional problems associated with disturbing 
practices that have been working at least reasonably well over time and that may reflect various 
compromises that would be difficult to disentangle.88 
The Court in Noel Canning relied heavily on such Burkean consequentialist reasoning.  
In deferring to past practice concerning the scope of the President’s recess appointments power, 
the Court noted that the frequent and longstanding use of recess appointments “suggests that 
the Senate and President have recognized that recess appointments can be both necessary and 
                                               
84 See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on the Justice Department’s 
Libya Opinion *3 (Harvard National Security Journal 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/VA76-E2Y3 (contending 
that, although “practice can affect the Constitution’s meaning and allocation of power,” “[a] practice of 
constitutional dimension must be regarded by both political branches as a juridical norm” before it does so); 
Roisman, supra note 64, at 710 (contending that the only historical practice that should be credited is that which 
“is likely to be indicative of constitutional agreement between the branches”). 
85 See generally Bradley, supra note 19. 
86  For discussion of the Court’s arguably contrary view in INS v. Chadha, see infra note 218 and 
accompanying text. 
87 One of us previously identified reliance interests as a separate set of reasons for crediting gloss.  See 
Bradley, supra note 19, at 67.  But reliance interests are a kind of consequentialist consideration and thus, for 
analytical simplicity, can be grouped under Burkean consequentialism.  Similarly, it is possible to break out the 
value of “settlement” as its own justification.  Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Fourth Amendment Gloss, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 
701, 717–18 (2019) (treating settlement as a separate justification for gloss).  But that value is sufficiently related 
to Burkean consequentialist arguments that we have included it under that label, again for analytical simplicity.    
88 See, e.g., Mitchell Pearsall Reich, Incomplete Designs, 94 TEX. L. REV. 807, 831 (2016) (“A Burkean-
minded judge deciding whether to upset a settled interpretation of a clause cannot contend just with history’s 
judgment that the interpretation of the clause itself is correct.  She must also recognize history’s judgment that 
numerous institutional decisions that likely surround it—and which the judge may be unable to identify, let alone 
evaluate—are useful, workable, and correct as well.”); Sunstein, supra note 35, at 401 (“If Congress and [the 
President] have settled on certain accommodations, there is reason to believe that those accommodations make 
institutional sense.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331588 
 18 
appropriate in certain circumstances.”89  The Court thereby emphasized the shared view of the 
political branches on workability rather than on constitutional interpretation.  The Court also 
stressed reliance interests, noting that it was concerned about “upset[ting] the compromises and 
working arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves have reached,” as 
well as about “seriously shrink[ing] the authority that Presidents have believed existed and have 
exercised for so long.”90 
A second set of reasons for invoking gloss concerns limits on decisional capacity.91 
Sometimes interpreters invoke practice because other constitutional materials are perceived to 
offer insufficient guidance.92   That may be especially likely with respect to questions of 
executive power, given the limited textual guidance in Article II of the Constitution and 
uncertainties about questions of original meaning, as well as substantial changes in the nature 
of the presidency and international affairs over time.93  For such issues, unless decisionmakers 
abstain altogether, relying upon practice may offer the best option for a reasoned disposition of 
the case that seeks to avoid appealing simply to a policy assessment, partisan calculation, or 
“choosing a side” in a dispute between the branches.   
That sort of reasoning was also evident in Noel Canning.  The Court resorted to 
historical practice only after determining that the text of the Recess Appointments Clause was 
doubly ambiguous.94  The Court also emphasized the lack of judicial precedent, noting that 
“[w]e have not previously interpreted the Clause” and that it was “doing so for the first time in 
more than 200 years.”95  Moreover, in evaluating how the recess appointments power worked 
during intra-session Senate breaks, original understandings of the recess appointments power 
                                               
89 134 S. Ct. at 2560. 
90 Id. at 2560, 2573. 
91 Limits on judicial capacity, see Bradley, supra note 19, at 65–66, are a subset of limits on decisional 
capacity.  It is not just judges who may find that historical practice is the best available material.  The OLC opinions 
quoted in the introduction to this Article, for example, specifically invoke that consideration.  See supra text 
accompanying note 15. 
92 See, e.g., Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2594 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing, while 
expressing reservations about practice-based arguments, that an “ambiguous constitutional provision” is ripe for 
historical analysis) (emphasis added). 
93 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 417–18 (noting that Article II’s general language has given 
rise to a reliance on practice-based arguments concerning the scope of presidential powers). 
94 See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2561, 2568; see also supra note 92 (quoting Justice Scalia’s statement 
that textual ambiguity justifies resort to historical practice).  The question of whether the phrase “the Recess” in 
the Recess Appointments Clause includes intra-session recesses or only inter-session recesses strikes us as 
genuinely ambiguous, just as references to “the printing press” or “the automobile” can mean one thing in 
particular or the class of such things generally.  As a purely textual matter, however, we are less confident than the 
Court was that the phrase “Vacancies that may happen during the Recess” includes vacancies that predate the 
Recess.  On that issue, the Court’s finding of ambiguity may have been affected by its desire not to contradict 
longstanding political branch practice.  For a discussion, see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 12, at 47.  
95 134 S. Ct. at 2560. 
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were of limited use given that the Senate did not even begin taking significant intra-session 
breaks until after the Civil War.96 
Concerns about decisional capacity also explain why gloss reasoning is especially 
evident with respect to issues relating to presidential power in foreign affairs.97  The text of 
Article II is spare with respect to those issues and judicial precedent is also usually very limited.  
In part for those reasons, historical practice is often the best material to explain the President’s 
authority concerning matters such as recognizing foreign states, concluding executive 
agreements, terminating treaties, and using military force.98  Moreover, as a general matter, 
gloss is more likely to thrive and be consulted in areas of law, like foreign affairs, where judicial 
interventions are infrequent.99  Part of the reason is that when they have the choice, courts tend 
to prioritize their own precedents and reasoning over non-judicial materials.  In addition, when 
there is frequent judicial review, political actors tend to coordinate around the judicial decisions, 
so such decisions are likely to disrupt the ongoing development of practice that is required for 
gloss.  None of that is to say, however, that courts are always right to privilege their own 
decisions over political branch practice.  There can be good Burkean consequentialist reasons 
for courts to pay close attention to such practice even when judicial precedent is more common. 
A third set of justifications for gloss concerns deference to the constitutional 
interpretations of nonjudicial actors.  The basic idea here is a type of departmentalism,100 
whereby the constitutional views of the political branches are entitled to weight along with 
judicial interpretations, especially when the political branches agree on an interpretation.  
Among other things, deferring to such views can help reduce the countermajoritarian 
difficulty,101 which is particularly strong when unelected judges overturn the longstanding 
positions of elected representatives.  Those deference justifications tend to emphasize the views 
of the political branches about the constitutionality, and not just the desirability, of the practice 
in question, and such justifications look for whether a branch affected by a particular 
governmental practice acquiesces in the practice. 
Of the three types of justifications, only the deference justification potentially requires 
an interbranch agreement about the meaning of the Constitution.  And even some variants of 
the deference idea do not depend on a showing of agreement at the level of constitutional 
interpretation.  In particular, if one branch has long articulated a constitutional view about the 
separation of powers and the other branch has been silent, it may not be clear whether there is 
any agreement between the branches.  Nevertheless, the views of the branch that has maintained 
the position may still be entitled to some deference, especially if those views have been 
consistent and have reflected the positions of elected officials of both major political parties.  
                                               
96 See id. at 2564–65. 
97 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 420–21. 
98 See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 38–39, 183–84. 
99 See Bradley, supra note 19, at 68–69. 
100 Departmentalism “is the theory that each branch of government has the power to apply its own 
interpretation of the Constitution to its own actions.”  DANIEL A. FARBER & NEIL S. SIEGEL, UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 27 (2019). 
101 See supra text accompanying notes 38–40. 
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After  all, as Justice Frankfurter observed in Youngstown, longstanding executive practice is 
“engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution.”102  Similarly, in 
Noel Canning, the Supreme Court gave weight to the fact that “the publicly available opinions 
of Presidential legal advisers that we have found are nearly unanimous in determining that the 
[Recess Appointments] Clause authorizes” appointments during intrasession breaks.103   
Moreover, even if it requires a showing of agreement with respect to the meaning of the 
Constitution, the deference justification would not necessarily require interbranch agreement 
about the constitutional text.  Instead, it could be premised on the idea that part of constitutional 
reasoning is pragmatic (such as structural reasoning, as well as of course consequentialist 
reasoning, which typically informs structural reasoning), and that the political branches will 
have a better understanding than courts do of the operational feasibility and desirability of 
particular separation of powers arrangements.  That idea seems to be reflected in the suggestion 
that is sometimes made by the Supreme Court and executive branch lawyers that gloss entails 
a “practical construction” of the Constitution. 104   The more we accept that constitutional 
interpretation involves an exercise in pragmatic judgment, the less we will require that the 
nonjudicial actors have formulated understandings about the text or original understanding of 
the Constitution, as opposed to what works well in helping the constitutional system to function. 
The other justifications for gloss have an even weaker connection to any requirement of 
agreement with respect to constitutional meaning.  For example, Burkean consequentialism can 
support looking to historical practice even absent any evidence of such agreement because of 
its focus on the value of established ways of doing things and a concern about the risks of 
change.105  Similarly, limits on decisional capacity can suggest deferring to practice even if it 
does not clearly reflect a common constitutional understanding of the political branches, 
because the practice can still provide a type of precedent external to an interpreter’s preferences 
or values. 
An advantage of not requiring evidence of an interbranch agreement about the meaning 
of the Constitution is that it is often unclear why a legislature does what it does.  Congress is a 
large “they,” not an “it,” and there are problems of aggregation and attribution in discerning 
legislative intent that are familiar to scholars of statutory interpretation.106  Moreover, when 
discerning gloss, interpreters (such as the Court in Noel Canning and Zivotofsky) often 
                                               
102 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
103 134 S. Ct. at 2562. 
104 See, e.g., The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 675 (1929); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 691 (1892); 
see also, e.g., Office of Legal Counsel, Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty: 
Memorandum Opinion for the United States Trade Representative, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 232, 233 (Nov. 22, 
1994) (noting that “a significant guide to the interpretation of the Constitution’s requirements is the practical 
construction placed on it by the executive and legislative branches acting together”). 
105 Cf. Young, supra note 82, at 556–58  (noting that Burkean justifications for crediting historical practice 
do not require a showing of agreement and instead look to whether the practice is “subject to contention and 
dispute”) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 77). 
106  See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
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emphasize congressional inaction in response to longstanding executive branch practice,107 yet 
it is often impossible to know whether such inaction represents constitutional agreement or is 
better attributed to other considerations.108  As applied, therefore, the acquiescence component 
of gloss often has meant only reasonable stability in the practice. 
Many important governmental practices have become at least reasonably well-settled 
without any clear evidence of an inter-branch agreement about the meaning of the Constitution.  
For example, it is not evident that the recess appointments practices accepted in Noel Canning 
were the product of such an agreement.  The Court was content to observe that, while some 
Senators had disagreed with the President’s position that the Recess Appointments Clause 
allowed intra-session appointments, the Senate as a body had not taken “formal action” to 
oppose the President’s practices, which falls short of an actual agreement between the President 
and the Senate about anything, let alone about the meaning of the Constitution.109  Similarly, 
the Court noted that while the Senate had at times opposed the President’s view that the recess 
appointments power applied to vacancies that occurred before a recess, the Senate had 
“subsequently abandoned its hostility,” 110  which again falls short of an agreement about 
constitutional meaning. 
Another prominent example, from the foreign affairs area, is the modern 
interchangeability of congressional-executive agreements with the Article II treaty ratification 
process.111  Congressional-executive agreements are international agreements concluded by the 
executive with the authorization or approval of a majority of each house of Congress rather than 
with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.  Although not clearly authorized by the 
text of the Constitution, congressional-executive agreements represent the vast majority of the 
international agreements concluded by the United States since World War II, and arguments 
about historical practice dominate discussions of their “interchangeability” with treaties.112  It 
is clear that there has been much bipartisan practice and that such practice has been deemed 
useful by both political branches.  But it is not clear that there is an interbranch agreement about 
the meaning of the Constitution’s Treaty Clause, and at times there have been disputes between 
                                               
107 See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s emphasis on congressional inaction 
in Noel Canning and Zivotofsky). 
108 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 69–70 (1988) 
(arguing, in the statutory interpretation context, that “legislative inaction should rarely be given much, or any, 
weight” as evidence of “the actual collective will or desire of the enacting legislature”).  We are focused here only 
on inaction as evidence of acquiescence in another branch’s exercise of authority, not as evidence that the inactive 
branch itself lacks authority to act.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–82.  Before attributing the latter 
significance to inaction, it might make sense to require evidence that the inaction has been the result of perceived 
unconstitutionality.  See, e.g., Bradley & Siegel, supra note 19, at 292–312 (documenting, in twentieth century 
debates in Congress and the executive branch, expressions of concern that stripping the appellate jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court would be unconstitutional). 
109 134 S. Ct. at 2564. 
110 Id. at 2572. 
111 For a discussion of that phenomenon, which supports the claims made in this paragraph, see Bradley 
& Morrison, supra note 1, at 468–76. 
112 See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
961 (2001). 
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the Senate and the executive branch about the extent of interchangeability of Article II treaties 
and congressional-executive agreements.   
Yet another example from the foreign affairs area, which we mentioned in the 
Introduction, is presidential authority to use military force in the absence of congressional 
authorization.  The text of the Constitution assigns a variety of war-related powers to Congress, 
including the authority to declare war, and many scholars have concluded that the original 
understanding of those provisions was that presidents would need congressional authorization 
before ordering non-defensive uses of military force.113  At least since World War II, however, 
Presidents have often ordered small-scale or short-term uses of force that do not involve self-
defense, without seeking congressional authorization, and many commentators have concluded 
that this practice must be given weight in the constitutional analysis.114  But there is no clear 
inter-branch agreement on the constitutionality of the practice, and, indeed, Congress in the 
1973 War Powers Resolution expressed a sharply different view of presidential war powers 
authority than the one long maintained by the executive branch.115 
Additional examples of practice-based gloss in the absence of constitutional agreement 
between two branches can be found when considering the relationship between Congress and 
the federal judiciary, which is another of the three coordinate branches.  For example, the 
permissibility of Congress’s use of non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate cases that fall within 
the Article III judicial power (including in administrative agencies) has been accepted by the 
Supreme Court (with some modest limitations) based in part on longstanding practice.  Yet the 
Court has not suggested that it defers to such practice because of an agreement with Congress 
about the meaning of Article III; instead, it has indicated that it defers to such practice because 
it is longstanding.116  Similarly, the text of Article III can be read to suggest that Congress must 
fully vest all of the nine categories of judicial power in the federal courts (the text of Article III 
                                               
113 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1993) (arguing that the original understanding 
of the Constitution was that “all wars, big or small, ‘declared’ in so many words or not . . . had to be legislatively 
authorized”); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1547 (2002) (concluding, 
based on textualist and originalist considerations, that “Congress generally has the power to initiate hostilities”). 
114 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, War Powers “Short of War,” 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201, 204 (1995) (“History 
shows that Presidents have exercised authority to engage in ‘little wars,’ to deploy forces ‘short of war,’ in a 
number of cases—a goodly number—of differing importance.”); Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of 
Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338, 1355 (1993) (reviewing ELY, supra note 113) (“Ultimately, war powers law 
does not lend itself to refined parchment solutions.  It is rather the ‘court of history,’ an accretion of interactions 
among the branches, that gives rise to basic norms governing the branches’ behavior in the area.”). 
115 See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (“The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to 
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities 
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific 
statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or 
possessions, or its armed forces.”). 
116 See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982) (plurality opinion) 
(“In sum, this Court has identified three situations in which Art. III does not bar the creation of legislative courts. 
In each of these situations, the Court has recognized certain exceptional powers bestowed upon Congress by the 
Constitution or by historical consensus.” (emphasis added)); see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504–05 
(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A]n Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless there is a 
firmly established historical practice to the contrary.” (emphasis added)).  For additional discussion of practice-
based influences on the law of federal courts, see Young, supra note 82. 
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provides that the federal judicial power “shall be vested”117), but that argument is viewed as a 
non-starter in large part due to very long historical practice to the contrary.118  But, again, it is 
not clear that judicial deference to such practice is the result of any agreement about the 
meaning of Article III. 
*     *     * 
In sum, under the historical gloss approach as we have described it, when the 
Constitution is perceived to be unclear or indeterminate as it relates to the separation of powers, 
longstanding governmental practices that have proven to be stable are consulted to inform 
constitutional interpretation.  Those practices need not date to the early post-Founding period, 
and they can still qualify as gloss even if they differ from earlier practices.  An inter-branch 
agreement about constitutional meaning is not required for gloss, although evidence of such an 
agreement will bolster the case for the requisite stability. 
C.  Gloss’s Domain 
Recall how Justice Frankfurter described the idea of “gloss” in Youngstown: the actions 
and interactions of federal government institutions over time can help resolve questions about 
the constitutional scope of their respective authority.  Under that conception, gloss would 
primarily be relevant to questions relating to the separation of powers.  In this section, we 
explain why resort to gloss is most defensible in that context.  This does not mean that reliance 
on historical practice is never appropriate in other domains; rather, our claim is simply that 
resort to practice is often less necessary outside the separation of powers context and tends to 
raise additional concerns that would need to be addressed.  Nor do we mean to imply that there 
is always a clear division between separation of powers issues, on the one hand, and federalism 
and individual rights issues on the other, although we do think that those commonly-used 
categories are useful in many situations.  Finally, we acknowledge that reasonable minds can 
differ on the question of gloss’s domain; we address it here not because it is essential to limit 
gloss to the separation of powers context in order for it to be normatively attractive, but rather 
because, if gloss were limited in that way, such a limitation might provide an additional basis 
for distinguishing it from liquidation. 
1. Separation of Powers.  As noted in the previous section, resort to historical practice 
is often necessary in separation of powers controversies given the paucity of alternative 
decisional materials.  Part of the reason is that there does not exist among judges and 
commentators a well-developed normative sense of the horizontal division and interrelation of 
powers.  The point is not that some jurists and scholars emphasize the values of efficiency and 
                                               
117 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).  Supreme Court 
Justice Joseph Story construed that clause as requiring the vesting of all the judicial power in the federal courts, 
see Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816), and Professor Akhil Amar has advanced a 
version of that argument.  See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers 
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 208–09 (1985); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1503–05 (1990). 
118 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1585 
(1990).  
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accountability while others emphasize the importance of preserving individual liberty through 
a balance of powers among the branches;119 after all, disagreement is common in constitutional 
interpretation.  The point, rather, is a widespread sense of uncertainty about which values are 
most central, as well as the severe under-determinacy of certain values (especially the notion of 
“balance”).120  As a result, historical practice almost inevitably plays a more significant role in 
resolving separation of powers disputes than it does in resolving disputes that arise in other 
areas of constitutional law. 
Decisional capacity is also limited in the separation of powers context because judicial 
precedent, textualism, and originalism are often of little help.  Judges tend either to avoid 
separation of powers controversies or else to decide them narrowly, leaving little judicial 
precedent on point when the next controversy arises.121  Relative to other areas of constitutional 
law, justiciability doctrines such as standing requirements and the political question doctrine 
are particularly robust in that context (especially in the lower courts).122  As for textualism, 
Article II of the Constitution is notoriously obscure in spelling out the boundaries of executive 
power and how it interacts with legislative power.  And originalism is of limited help because 
the Founders simply could not have imagined the nature of the modern presidency or the 
conditions under which it operates.  That reality prompted Justice Jackson to offer a memorable 
observation in Youngstown: 
A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty of really 
useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive 
power as they actually present themselves.  Just what our forefathers did 
envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must 
be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called 
upon to interpret for Pharaoh.123 
                                               
119 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1729-30 (1996) 
(identifying balance among the branches, responsibility and accountability to the electorate, and energetic, efficient 
government as the objectives of the separation of powers); Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and 
the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419, 481 (2015, no. 2) (surveying the literature and 
identifying liberty, efficacy, and accountability as the functions of the separation of powers identified by different 
scholars and judges).  See also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the Constitution 
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers 
into a workable government.”). 
120 See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 603, 604–05 (2001) (“[I]t is a hopeless enterprise to talk about balance among the branches of government.  
We have not come close to articulating a vision of what an ideal balance would look like.”). 
121  The hierarchical relationship between historical gloss and judicial precedent is interesting and 
complex, and we cannot do it justice in this Article.  In part because of modern norms of judicial supremacy, gloss 
of the sort we are focused on is unlikely to arise in the face of contrary judicial precedent.  See Bradley, supra note 
19, at 69.  But if it does, that seems like at least one argument against stare decisis, which is concerned in part with 
protecting reliance interests.  In any event, the scope of judicial precedent must be interpreted, and historical 
practice is likely to be a factor in such interpretation. 
122 For example, lower courts continue to apply the political question doctrine with some frequency to 
cases concerning foreign relations and national security, many of which implicate separation of powers questions.  
See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 66–67. 
123 343 U.S. at 634. 
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 In addition, Burkean consequentialist and deference justifications for gloss fit best with 
the separation of powers context.  At least as a general matter, the political branches are likely 
to have a better sense than the courts of what works well in matters of governance, especially 
in the face of substantially changed conditions.  Moreover, because those branches routinely 
interact and bargain with each other, their practices are especially likely to reflect compromises 
and working adjustments that may be difficult to disentangle when examining particular 
constitutional issues in isolation. 124   Finally, because the separation of powers context 
implicates the interactions of co-equal federal branches, each charged with upholding and 
applying the Constitution, the case for judicial deference to the product of their interactions is 
higher than the case for deference to practice in other contexts.  
 
2.  Federalism.  Gloss does not seem to be as well suited to issues of federalism, where 
the practices in question are not of co-equal branches but rather of the national government and 
the constituent states.  For one thing, relative to the separation of powers, there appears to exist 
among many judges and commentators a more developed normative sense of the primary role 
of the federal government in the constitutional scheme.  Of course, there are numerous heated 
disagreements in particular areas of constitutional federalism, and there are robust disputes 
among courts and commentators over whether preserving a prominent regulatory role for the 
states advances various so-called “values of federalism,” including individual liberty, political 
participation, accountability, responsiveness, value pluralism, democratic experimentation, and 
local efficiency. 125   Nonetheless, it is striking that an ideologically diverse array of 
commentators has emphasized the role of the federal government in solving problems that the 
states are not well situated to address on their own, especially multi-state collective action 
problems.126  Although fully defending that claim would take this Article too far afield, it is 
supported by the historical background out of which the Constitution arose (i.e., states acted 
individually in the commercial and military spheres when they needed to act collectively to 
solve national problems, conduct international diplomacy, and defend the nation),127 and by the 
                                               
124 Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014); John O. 
McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational 
Choice in the Separation of Powers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 293. 
125 For a discussion of the values of federalism, with citations to the literature, see generally Neil S. Siegel, 
International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (2008).   
126 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107–08 (2005); Jack M. 
Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010); Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The 
Scope of Congress’s Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849 (2002); Steven G. Calabresi, 
“A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 
(1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of American Federalism, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2011); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010); Richard E. Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 1241 (1997); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally 
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 554–57 (1995); Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which 
Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (1934).   
127  For a recent, detailed account, see generally GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, WE HAVE NOT A 
GOVERNMENT: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND THE ROAD TO THE CONSTITUTION (2017); see also, e.g., 
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 24–28, 47–
48, 102–08, 167–68, 188–89 (1996) (cataloguing the problems with the Articles of Confederation); AMAR, supra 
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increasingly prominent role of the federal government in American life since the 1930s in 
addressing races to the bottom, interstate externalities, and certain rights violations.128  As 
Steven Calabresi and Nicholas Terrell have written, “[t]he most compelling argument in 
American history for empowering our national government has been the need to overcome 
collective action problems.”129   
Historical practice, however, may have little correlation with what is required today to 
enable the federal government to address collective action problems.  By definition, the states 
themselves have inadequate incentives to solve multistate collective action problems by 
regulating on their own.  Their rationally self-interested incentives, rather, are to externalize 
costs onto other states.  Accordingly, there may be a good deal of state regulation in an area of 
traditional state concern, but such regulation may be creating or exacerbating multistate 
collective action problems, not solving them.130 
Moreover, federal regulation may have long been absent for reasons having little to do 
with the existence or scope of a collective action problem.  Alternative possibilities include 
competing political priorities (such as wars and depressions), changing social values (on such 
matters as environmental protection and civil rights), improperly imposed constitutional 
constraints on Congress (such as during the Lochner Era), and effective political resistance by 
powerful minority interests in Congress (such as the Southern opposition that doomed federal 
civil rights legislation in the twentieth century until 1964).131 
Furthermore, the scope of collective action problems may change over time.132  A good 
example of changed conditions is the importance of education to economic productivity in an 
information economy with easy interstate mobility due to improved transportation networks.133  
Whatever may have been the scope of certain problems in the past, significant changes in 
                                               
note 126, at 44–46, 106–08 (same); Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 616–23 (1999) 
(same).    
   128 Many federal laws, including statutes regulating securities, the environment, civil rights, public health, 
and criminality, fit that description.  See, e.g., Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence, supra note 126, at 46–47 
(defining collective action problems for the states and discussing examples in the areas of environmental law and 
civil rights); see also Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2341, 2342 (1996) (“The two justifications most prominently offered . . . for environmental regulation at the 
federal level focus on the existence of a ‘race to the bottom’ and of interstate externalities.”). 
129 Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 126, at 6.  Ameliorating collective action problems is obviously not 
the only function of the federal government.  It also plays a vital role in protecting individual rights, as illustrated 
in part by the amendments that were added to the Constitution after the Civil War and during the twentieth century.  
See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
130 See Siegel, supra note 82, at 812–13.  
131 See id. at 813.  For a collective action analysis of some of those examples, see Siegel, Free Riding on 
Benevolence, supra note 126, at 46–47.  For the legislative story of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES 
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 2–23 (4th ed. 2007).  
132 See Siegel, supra note 82, at 813.   
133 For a discussion of potential spillover effects on other states in such circumstances, see BALKIN, supra 
note 46, at 172–73.  
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society, the economy, and technology may mean that the scope of those problems is interstate 
in the present. 134   The customary allocation of regulatory authority between the federal 
government and the states is unlikely to track the existence of significant problems of collective 
action facing the states—however preferable reliance on custom may be to cost-benefit 
calculations in other settings.135   
Finally, in the federalism area, structural reasoning and judicial precedent abound, and 
originalist argumentation also plays a role.  Indeed, invocations of historical practice in 
federalism cases are typically secondary to the other modalities of constitutional interpretation 
that drive the analysis.  Prominent examples of federalism decisions that emphasize those other 
modalities include McCulloch v. Maryland136 and United States v. Lopez.137   
3.  Individual Rights.  As Chief Justice Marshall appeared to sense in McCulloch, 
reliance on historical practice is most questionable in individual rights cases.  In beginning his 
opinion in McCulloch by invoking historical practice, he offered the caveat that “the great 
principles of liberty are not concerned.”138  Although he did not explain that qualification, he 
presumably assumed that how the political branches and the states traditionally interacted with 
one another raised different normative questions from how they interacted with private citizens.   
One obvious potential difference between individual rights cases and structural cases is 
that individual rights cases can implicate concerns, generally not present in structural cases, 
about popular majorities continuing to oppress unpopular minorities.  In addition, the practice 
potentially relevant to individual rights controversies tends to be different in kind from what is 
relevant to structural disputes.  In particular, whereas the focus in structural disputes is on the 
practices of governmental institutions, individual rights cases involve the effects of general 
                                               
134 See id. at 172 (“If an area of concern has significant spillover effects on other states, or begins to do 
so, it shouldn’t matter that it was the traditional concern of state regulation.”).  For a more general discussion of 
why it is problematic to assume that novelty of a federal statute renders it constitutionally suspect, see generally 
Litman, supra note 82. 
135 See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom 
in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1992) (“[G]iven the imperfections of the legal system, the conventional 
wisdom that places cost-benefit analysis first and custom second [in the law of negligence] is incorrect . . . .”). 
136 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (beginning with historical practice but deciding the case primarily on 
structural grounds).  See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 
(1969) (“In [McCulloch], perhaps the greatest of our constitutional cases, judgment is reached not fundamentally 
on the basis of that kind of textual exegesis which we tend to regard as normal, but on the basis of reasoning from 
the total structure which the text has created.”).  For further discussion of the Court’s reasoning in McCulloch, see 
infra notes 265–274 and accompanying text. 
137 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (emphasizing that criminal law and education are traditional subjects of state 
regulation only after deciding the case on the ground that Congress was regulating noneconomic activity).  See 
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 206 (writing of the 
Lopez Court’s invocation of traditional subjects of state regulation that “it is too late in this game to forgive the 
Court for this move” because “over and over, in a wide range of federalism contexts, just this line has proved itself 
Maginot”).  Accord Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in 
the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 335 (criticizing “the indeterminacy of any approach that tries to divide 
up the world into spheres of state and federal primacy”).   
138 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 197.  
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social practices or beliefs on individuals—that is, the effects of “traditions” more broadly 
conceived.139   
To be sure, arguments from tradition are common, and at times highly controversial, in 
certain individual rights controversies.140   Subject matter areas in which tradition may be 
invoked include substantive due process, the Establishment Clause, capital punishment, and 
gun rights.141  In such controversies, whether consulting tradition is normatively attractive is 
likely to divide courts and commentators ideologically and methodologically.  Those who are 
concerned  that past mistreatment of vulnerable individuals and groups risks furnishing its own 
justification for continuing to mistreat such individuals and groups142 will not think significant 
weight should be placed on tradition in individual rights controversies, at least as a general 
matter.  Those who believe that conventional societal morality should significantly inform the 
scope of individual rights will likely disagree.143  Such disagreement reflects a more basic 
disagreement about the purposes that certain rights provisions exist to accomplish.  The key 
point here, however, is that looking to tradition in that way is a different enterprise from looking 
to the historical practice that is considered relevant under the historical gloss approach.  
Although the categories of public action and private action are often not clearly distinct, 
governmental actors in the rights context interact with those who possess far less power than 
the government to push back or advance contrary understandings.  As a result, the institutional 
deference and Burkean consequentialist justifications for relying on practice are weaker in that 
context.144  
It also seems less necessary to rely upon historical practice in many individual rights 
cases, given the availability of alternative decisional materials beyond the personal preferences 
or values of the interpreter.  Those materials primarily include judicial precedent, which is 
typically plentiful.  When such precedent is unavailable or is thought to be insufficiently 
persuasive to be followed, courts and commentators sometimes can investigate the original 
                                               
139 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 416.  
140 See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Essay, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation and Constitutional Interpretation, 32 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193 (2009); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex 
Marriage, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2011); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory 
of Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985); Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and 
Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1745 (2015).  
141 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (substantive due process); Town of Greece 
v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (Establishment Clause); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (capital 
punishment); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment incorporation).   
142 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“If rights were defined by who exercised 
them in the past, then received practices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not 
invoke rights once denied.”).  See also Sunstein, supra note 35, at 400 (“Under some constitutional provisions, 
above all the Equal Protection Clause, the Burkean [tradition-based] approach is hard or perhaps impossible to 
square with entrenched understandings in American constitutional law . . . .”).  
143 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 140, at 1775–76 (arguing that rights should be protected under 
substantive due process only if they are objectively, deeply rooted in American history and tradition).  
144 Cf. Huq, supra note 87, at 758–59 (arguing that the justifications for relying in gloss in the separation 
of powers context do not support relying on historical practice in the Fourth Amendment context). 
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meaning of the constitutional provision at issue.145  Alternatively, if one is not of an originalist 
bent, or if original meaning has run out, one can seek to discern the basic purpose or structural 
function of the provision in the constitutional scheme.146    
 In sum, the most defensible domain for the historical gloss approach is in the area of 
separation of powers.  To be sure, some of the arguments for relying upon historical practice in 
that context might also apply in some federalism and individual rights controversies.  Moreover, 
there is not always a perfectly neat division among the three contexts,147 and there may be 
relevant distinctions among different cases falling within a particular context.148  But some of 
the arguments for historical practice are specific to the separation of powers context, and 
extending such practice to other areas at least raises additional normative concerns. 
III.  LIQUIDATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO GLOSS 
 
Over the past two decades, a small number of originalist scholars have become 
interested in the concept of “liquidation,” which would allow post-Founding historical practice 
to resolve indeterminacies in the Constitution’s original meaning and thereby “fix” its 
meaning.149  That idea is frequently ascribed to James Madison, based on statements he made 
in The Federalist and in later writings.  Madison never presented a detailed explanation of the 
idea, and it has received only limited, albeit increasing, attention in the academic literature.  As 
a result, it is not entirely clear whether and to what extent the concept of liquidation differs from 
                                               
145 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding on originalist and other grounds 
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm, including a handgun, in the home 
for purposes of self-defense).  
146 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (asserting that “[t]he central purpose of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the 
basis of race”); Heller, 554 U.S. at 637, 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the structural function of the 
Second Amendment is to prevent Congress from disarming the state militias). 
147 To take the example in which the lines are perhaps the most blurred, constitutional questions about the 
scope of congressional power under the Reconstruction Amendments have a separation of powers dimension 
(because part of what is at stake is which branch controls the meaning of those amendments); a federalism 
dimension (because the broader one construes congressional power, the more state law is preempted); and an 
individual rights dimension (because the scope of congressional power is related to the content of the rights thought 
to be protected by the first section of each amendment).  For discussions, see, for example, Robert C. Post & Reva 
B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); and Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution 
from the People: Juriscentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003). 
148 For example, there are many different kinds of constitutional federalism questions, some of which 
have nothing to do with the existence or scope of collective action problems.  There is no reason to assume that 
historical practice is equally relevant or irrelevant to all such questions. 
149 Such indeterminacies include instances of ambiguity and vagueness.  Ambiguity exists when a text 
could mean more than one specific thing, while vagueness exists when the applicability of the text to particular 
circumstances is unclear.  See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, 97–98 (2010). 
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the historical gloss approach.  Indeed, as we noted in the Introduction, the majority in Noel 
Canning seemed to treat liquidation and gloss as the same phenomenon.150  
As we have noted elsewhere,151 there are a number of uncertainties concerning the 
theory of liquidation.  One such uncertainty is whether the settlement of constitutional meaning 
may occur only through early post-Founding practice, or whether it also may occur through 
later practice long after the Founding—and, if the latter, how likely it is that a settlement long 
after the Founding could take place.  It is also unclear whether, under the liquidation theory, an 
initial settlement through liquidation may be undone by a subsequent settlement through a new 
liquidation.  How one answers those questions will go a long way toward determining how 
much difference there is between the liquidation approach and the historical gloss approach. 
Until recently, Professor Caleb Nelson had presented the only extensive academic 
account of the liquidation theory, and his analysis was often referenced by others when 
discussing the concept.152  In seeking to explain why originalism does not “self-destruct” as a 
result of evidence that the Founders themselves expected constitutional meaning to evolve, 
Nelson contends that the Founders had in mind the concept of liquidation, pursuant to which 
constitutional meaning would become “fixed” through practice in a way that would not lead to 
“a perpetually evolving” Constitution.153  Under his account, the liquidation concept turns on 
initial practice, which typically although not necessarily will be early practice, and the first 
liquidation may not be undone through subsequent liquidation.     
 Another originalist scholar, William Baude, has recently presented a broader account 
of liquidation.  Baude does not insist that liquidation be based only on early practice, and, in 
contrast to Nelson, Baude argues that the first liquidation may be undone through subsequent 
liquidation.154 
 This Part critiques the idea of liquidation as both an actual and an attractive alternative 
to gloss.  We argue that Nelson’s narrow account of liquidation distinguishes liquidation from 
gloss, but that it does so in ways that are normatively problematic.  We then argue that, although 
Baude’s broader account of liquidation responds to some of our normative concerns by 
diminishing the distinction between liquidation and gloss, significant differences remain that 
continue to raise normative problems for liquidation.  Those normative problems should matter 
to originalists and non-originalists alike who seek to address indeterminacies in the 
constitutional text by resort to post-Founding practice.  Even for most originalists, the proper 
                                               
150 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2580 (2014) (citing a variety of decisions, some that 
have endorsed gloss, for the proposition that “our cases have continually confirmed Madison’s view”). 
151 See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 12, at 29–30. 
152  See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Liquid Constitutionalism, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (April 13, 2017) 
(“[O]riginalists (and nonoriginalists) have been seriously examining the concept of ‘liquidating’ meaning for quite 
a long time: at least since Caleb Nelson’s 2001 article, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 
Va. L. Rev. 1 (2001).”). 
153 See, e.g., Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 27, at 521.   
154 See generally Baude, supra note 28.  Although broader than Nelson’s account in that respect, there 
may be a way in which Baude’s account is narrower.  Specifically, it is not clear that Nelson would require, as 
Baude does, that the liquidation be validated by public approval.  See infra text accompanying note 221. 
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scope of that gap-filling enterprise, whether it is referred to as “constitutional construction” or 
part of “constitutional interpretation,” is a normative question that cannot itself be determined 
by the original meaning of the text.155 
A.  The Narrow Account: Normatively Attractive? 
1.  The Narrow Account of Liquidation.  One reason why originalist scholars might look 
to early post-Founding practice is that it might provide evidence of how the Constitution was 
understood by those who lived during the time when it was written and approved.156  Some 
originalist scholars, however, have suggested that such practice might be relevant in a different 
way.  Instead of looking to early practice as evidence of original meaning, those scholars 
attribute to the Founders the recognition that the constitutional text did not settle certain 
questions of constitutional meaning and that the answers to those questions would need to be 
worked out, or “liquidated,” through decisions and practices.157  Once liquidated, the argument 
goes, the meaning of the Constitution on those questions would become “fixed” and so not 
subject to change. 
The idea of liquidation through initial practice is most frequently associated with a 
statement made by James Madison in Federalist No. 37.  “All new laws,” he wrote in that essay, 
“though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature 
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be 
                                               
155 The exception is “original methods originalists,” who insist that constitutional methodologies used 
today must be those that would have been used by the Founders.  See infra text accompanying note 288.  This 
Article does not attempt to engage with possible Founding understandings about constitutional methodology other 
than to raise questions in Part IV about whether the liquidation theory is properly attributed to James Madison. 
156 See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. 
REV. 1487, 1498, 1537 (2005) (“Early interpretations evidence the original meaning of the Constitution because 
it is thought that early interpreters were likely to understand the meaning of the constitutional language and the 
context in which it was enacted.”); see also, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008) 
(describing “the examination of a variety of legal and other sources to determine the public understanding of a 
legal text in the period after its enactment or ratification” as “a critical tool of constitutional interpretation”).    
157 See, e.g., Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 27, at 525–53; see also Caleb 
Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2453 (2016) (“[L]eading members of the 
Founding generation anticipated that post-Founding practices or precedents would settle on one of the permissible 
interpretations of provisions that lent themselves to multiple readings.  In the absence of ‘extraordinary and 
peculiar circumstances,’ moreover, those liquidations were expected to be permanent . . . .”) (quoting Letter from 
James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 
183, 185 (1865)); Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
239, 309 (1989) (suggesting that Madison “expected vagueness in the Constitution to be resolved and made certain 
rather than that it would be an opportunity for flexibility and judicial adaptation of the Constitution to changing 
exigencies”).  Without specifically endorsing the liquidation thesis, Akhil Amar has argued that a number of the 
institutional practices of the Washington administration have had lasting precedential effect on understandings of 
presidential authority.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2012) (Chapter 8).  Our 
colleague Stephen Sachs reads Amar’s argument as embracing the idea of liquidation through early practice.  See 
Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797, 1806–08.  In the 
next chapter of his book, however, Amar goes on to discuss how institutional practices of Congress, the Supreme 
Court, and administrative agencies, including practices long after the Founding, “gloss and clarify the text, 
inducing interpreters to read the otherwise indeterminate text in a highly determinate way.”  Id. at 335. 
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liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”158  As that 
passage makes clear, Madison was not tying liquidation specifically to constitutional 
interpretation; he was simply observing that it was something that one should expect with all 
new laws (including statutory law and the common law).  Hamilton also made references to 
“liquidation” in The Federalist, similarly without suggesting that it was something specific to 
the Constitution.159  
Nelson argues that, when Founders such as Madison referred to the possibility that post-
Founding practice would “fix” constitutional meaning, they were using that term in a manner 
similar to those who, like the famous Anglo-Irish satirist Jonathan Swift, had advocated 
“fixing” the English language so that its meaning would not change over time. 160   The 
possibility of preventing change in the meaning of language was controversial in eighteenth-
century England, and Nelson notes that many Americans of the Founding generation probably 
assumed that change in language was inevitable.  But Nelson observes that “[w]hatever their 
position on this issue . . . Americans certainly were familiar with the idea of ‘fixing’ the 
language, and they associated this concept with permanence and immutability.”161  Madison’s 
references to “fixing” the meaning of the Constitution, Nelson contends, must be understood in 
that context: “[a]lthough Madison conceded that the words used in the Constitution might well 
fall out of favor or acquire new shades of meaning in later usage, he was suggesting that their 
meaning in the Constitution would not change; once that meaning was ‘fixed,’ it should 
endure.”162  
Under Nelson’s account, the Founders were delegating to governmental actors, and to 
the courts, the task of resolving indeterminacies in the original meaning of the Constitution.  As 
Nelson explains, regardless of whether the Founders viewed the liquidation process as part of 
the original meaning of the Constitution (thus binding as a matter of originalism today) or 
something associated with the background “general” law in existence at the time (thus not 
necessarily binding as a matter of originalism today), the basic idea of liquidation remained the 
                                               
158 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (Madison), at 229, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
Madison also referred to the liquidation idea in later writings, albeit decades after the Founding. See, e.g., Letter 
to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908). 
159 Alexander Hamilton observed in Federalist No. 78 that, when two statutes conflict, “it is the province 
of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning and operation.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Hamilton), at 468, in 
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 158; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Hamilton), at 150, in THE FEDERALIST 
PAPERS, supra (“Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation.”); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Hamilton), at 491, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra (“‘Tis time only that can mature 
and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in 
a harmonious and consistent WHOLE.”). 
160 See Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 27, at 530–35.  Historian Jonathan 
Gienapp observes that “language itself had become an urgent problem in many corners of the eighteenth century 
as the prospect of linguistic instability haunted rhetoricians, grammarians, and philosophers alike.”  GIENAPP, 
supra note 29, at 42; see also id. at 42–45 (discussing the epistemological concerns of Jonathan Swift, Samuel 
Johnson, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke). 
161 Id. at 534–35.  Accord GIENAPP, supra note 29, at 45 (“These far-ranging meditations on the perils of 
linguistic instability informed colonial American intellectual life.  The works of Swift, Johnson, Locke, and others 
were well-known . . . .”). 
162 Id. at 535 (emphasis added). 
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same: “reasonable members of the founding generation . . . might conceivably have read each 
indeterminate provision in the Constitution not only to define a range of permissible 
interpretations, but also to delegate power to the provision’s initial interpreters to make an 
authoritative selection within that range.”163  
As an aside, it is worth noting that this conception of liquidation goes beyond what 
might be entailed by analogizing the Swift-ian idea of fixing linguistic meeting to constitutional 
interpretation.  Such an analogy might simply suggest that the meaning of specific words in the 
Constitution should not change merely because usages of language change.  But no one 
contends otherwise, and that is not where the debate between originalists and non-originalists 
is centered.  The idea of constitutional liquidation is different: it is that the meaning of 
linguistically indeterminate provisions, and potentially also structural inferences from those 
provisions, can be settled by post-Founding practice. 
In any event, it is easy to see why the account of liquidation offered by Nelson would 
be attractive to at least some originalists.  For one thing, it tells interpreters where to look for 
evidence of constitutional meaning when indeterminacies in the text render it impossible to 
discern the original meaning—typically, in early post-Founding deliberations or decisions.  For 
another thing, by “fixing” the meaning, the account avoids the possibility that constitutional 
meaning might change over time absent a constitutional amendment.  We assume for now (and 
question later) that the two elements of the approach—looking only (or primarily) to initial 
practice and decisions and disallowing a subsequent interpretation that contradicts the one 
reflected in initial practice164—follow from Madison’s statements.  Even if that is the case, we 
contend that those two elements are normatively problematic along a number of dimensions. 
2.  Problems with the Narrow Account of Liquidation.  Assuming it could be shown that 
Madison did have in mind an approach whereby indeterminacies in original meaning could be 
settled by, and only by, initial practice, and assuming it could further be shown that some (or 
many or most) other Founders shared Madison’s view, those demonstrations would not 
themselves establish that constitutional interpreters today should accept such an approach.  As 
careful originalists like Nelson acknowledge, originalism cannot establish its own validity.165  
                                               
163 Id. at 551. Even if that approach is not binding as a matter of originalism today, Nelson notes that 
originalists might choose to follow it because “continuing to adhere to settled liquidations may help to promote 
the same sort of stability that attracts some people to originalism in the first place.”  Id. at 550 n.136.  For discussion 
of how “constitutional backdrops” might have contemporary legal force even if not part of the original meaning 
of the constitutional text, see Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813 (2012).   
164 See also, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning:  Not as Radical as It 
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMM. 257, 267 (2005) (understanding the liquidation concept as presented by Nelson to mean 
that “very early decisions and practices can ‘fix’ the original meaning of the text where the text is open-ended and, 
once fixed, this meaning cannot then be trumped by later judicial decision”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy 
Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 787 (2010) (“Acknowledging that some constitutional provisions 
would require future liquidation, many prominent originalists, however, would accept only those liquidating 
precedents that arose close in time to the founding.”); Michael B. Rappaport, Why Non-Originalism Does Not 
Justify Departing from the Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 889, 
893 n. 8 (2015) (“If there is an early series of decisions that are consistent, which are then followed by a later series 
of decisions that adopt a different view, then it is by no means clear that the later series can liquidate the meaning.”). 
165 See, e.g., Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 27, at 547–48.  Modern 
variants of originalism, unlike the first generation of originalist scholarship, focus on the original meaning of the 
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A normative defense of the liquidation approach narrowly defined would need to address 
substantial objections. 
The theory behind the liquidation idea, to reiterate, is that the Founders delegated the 
settlement of indeterminacies in constitutional meaning to subsequent governmental actors.166  
It is unclear, however, why it would have made sense for the Founders to decide that 
constitutional meaning should be determined dispositively by the particular political alignment 
that happened to exist whenever the issue first arose.  In attempting to determine constitutional 
meaning, the initial generation of political actors presumably would be no less self-serving, 
partisan, and potentially short-sighted than later generations, and they would have much less 
experience in apprehending the needs of American governance.167  While there was often talk 
of the importance of civic virtue in the Founding period,168  the politics of the time were 
acrimonious, and the debates over ratification of the Constitution displayed sharp 
disagreements over basic issues such as the proper scope of national government power.169  
Moreover, the initial post-Founding generations obviously lacked knowledge of subsequent 
changes in conditions and values that could dramatically affect the implications of adopting one 
interpretation of the Constitution instead of another.  Notwithstanding those substantial 
limitations, the liquidation approach would license earlier generations of politicians to bind 
more experienced successors through simple majoritarian politics.170 
                                               
Constitution rather than on original intent. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013).  That shift in focus further complicates any claim that a liquidation approach to 
the Constitution should be followed because Founders such as James Madison intended it.  To be sure, 
considerations of intent and meaning may not be neatly separable, so it might be argued (for example) that 
liquidation was part of the background understandings about how the Constitution would operate.  Cf. Sachs, supra 
note 163.  Again, however, even if that could be shown, it would not by itself establish that liquidation should be 
followed. 
166 See Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, supra note 27, at 551. 
167 A principal theme of the Federalist Papers is the importance of learning the lessons of experience.  
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (Madison), at 104, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 158 (“Is it not the 
glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and 
other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the 
suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own 
experience?”).  The Federalist Papers do not suggest that the need to learn from experience would expire with the 
ratification of the Constitution. 
168  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (Hamilton or Madison), in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra 
note 158 (“The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most 
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the 
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.”). 
169 For a discussion, see generally RAKOVE, supra note 127. 
170  One common justification for Chevron deference to administrative agencies rests on a similar 
delegation account.  “Deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a statute that it administers,” the 
Court has explained, “is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from 
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
159 (2000) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).  Under 
Chevron, however, agencies are not precluded from changing their interpretations (and, indeed, Chevron itself 
involved a revised agency interpretation).  See, e.g., National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand 
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Those objections are not overcome by positing that liquidation should be limited to 
situations in which the earlier generations deliberated with unusual seriousness.171  Even if one 
could identify a way to distinguish different levels of congressional or executive branch 
seriousness, the more fundamental problem would remain that subsequent generations might 
deliberate at least as seriously and they would necessarily possess substantially more knowledge 
and experience.172  The net effect of widespread acceptance of the narrow version of the 
liquidation idea would be a regime that possesses many of the “dead hand” disadvantages of 
originalism, but few of the theory’s asserted upsides—namely, preventing constitutional change 
outside the demanding supermajoritarian process of Article V, and conferring democratic 
legitimacy upon the institution of judicial review by limiting it to enforcement of the original 
supermajoritarian act of higher lawmaking.  
Another problem with Nelson’s embrace of liquidation over historical gloss is that such 
an embrace is in tension with the acceptance by many originalists of judicial precedent, as 
discussed in Part I.  Justice Scalia, for example, made clear that he accepted the presumptively 
binding force of precedent in a number of areas of constitutional law.173  He described his 
approach to precedent as a pragmatic “exception” to his originalism that was based on interests 
in stability.174  Similarly, Judge Robert Bork accepted that a decision “may be clearly incorrect 
but nevertheless have become so embedded in the life of the nation, so accepted by the society, 
so fundamental to the private and public expectations of individuals and institutions, that the 
result should not be changed now.”175  But, as emphasized above,176 interests in stability and 
related rule-of-law considerations, such as consistency, predictability, reliance, and 
transparency, can also be advanced by adhering to longstanding practices, regardless of whether 
they date to the early post-Founding period, and regardless of whether they were the initial 
practices.177 
                                               
X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the 
agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework.”). 
171 See id. at 528. 
172 Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819):  
This provision is made in a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently 
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. . . .  To have declared that the best means 
shall not be used, but those alone without which the power given would be nugatory, would have 
been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, 
and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances. 
Id. at 415. 
173 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Despite 
my misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original matter, I have acquiesced in the Court’s incorporation 
of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights ‘because it is both long established and narrowly limited.’ Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).”). 
174 See SCALIA, supra note 57, at 139–40. 
175 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 158 (1990). 
176 See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
177 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 427–28; Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism v. Burkeanism: A 
Dialogue Over Recess, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 126, 128 (2013).  Compare Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and 
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Other originalists like Professor Randy Barnett have suggested that deference to judicial 
precedent can be reconciled with originalism based in part on the idea of constitutional 
construction.  As Barnett notes, “an original meaning originalist can take the abstract meaning 
as given, and accept that the application of this vague meaning to particular cases is left to future 
actors, including judges, to decide.”178  But, as that sentence implies, the “future actors” need 
not be judges and could instead be political actors developing historical practice.  Madison, it 
is worth underscoring, grouped judicial precedent and political practices together.179  Indeed, 
even when referring to “adjudications” of constitutional meaning,180 it is unlikely that he was 
referring only or primarily to judicial determinations, as opposed to legislative ones.  Among 
other things, he was writing in the late eighteenth century, long before modern notions of 
judicial supremacy, at a time when most major constitutional questions were settled outside the 
courts.  
In any case, if “liquidation” based on practice is like the development of judicial 
precedent, it should potentially include modern practice and be subject to revision.181  Many 
scholars—and particularly many originalists—believe that the Supreme Court should at least 
sometimes be willing to overrule its precedents when they conflict with what those same 
scholars understand to be the “proper” interpretation of the Constitution.  If the Supreme Court 
can be wrong the first time it interprets the Constitution, surely the political branches can also 
be wrong the first time they interpret the Constitution.  Consider, for example, the Judiciary Act 
of 1802, which reflected the Jeffersonian conviction that it was constitutionally permissible to 
end the tenure of Article III judges by abolishing their courts.  The Jeffersonian view was not 
subsequently regarded as the final word on the meaning of the “good Behaviour” protection for 
judicial independence in Section One of Article III.182   
There are, to be sure, statements in a number of Supreme Court decisions suggesting 
that practices dating back to near the Founding can “fix[] the construction” to be given to 
constitutional provisions.183  Those statements, however, do not contend that this is the only 
                                               
the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 588 (2001) (noting that stare 
decisis “promotes stability, protects settled expectations, and conserves judicial resources”). 
178 Barnett, supra note 164, at 264. 
179 As discussed in Part I, see supra note 58 and accompanying text, some originalists accept judicial 
precedent not as a pragmatic exception to originalism but as part of Article III judicial power, and so in that way 
might be able to reconcile an acceptance of judicial precedent with a rejection of nonjudicial precedent, depending 
on their grounds for accepting certain judicial precedents and not others, and also depending on whether 
consideration of nonjudicial precedent is part of the Article III judicial power.   
180 See supra text accompanying note 158. 
181 When discussing the concept of liquidation as applied to judicial precedent, Professor Nelson has 
suggested that subsequent interpreters could reject a precedent if they “remained convinced that a prior 
construction went beyond the range of indeterminacy.”  Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 27, at 14.  In other 
words, under his account, a liquidation could be revisited if, but only if, subsequent interpreters concluded that it 
had not been an appropriate matter for liquidation in the first place.  Within the zone of permissible liquidation, 
however, the views of early interpreters would be treated as dispositive. 
182 For discussion of that history, see Grove, supra note 25, at 473-88. 
183 See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (“So, when their practice in the matter is 
appraised according to the circumstances in which it was begun and to those in which it has been continued, it falls 
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way in which constitutional meaning may legitimately be affected by practice.  Moreover, those 
statements do not envision that meaning would become fixed merely as a result of the initial 
practice; rather, they expressly require longstanding acquiescence in the interpretation that was 
adopted.  That is also true of Justice Scalia’s acknowledgment in Noel Canning that it would 
be appropriate to look to practices “unchallenged since the early days of the Republic.”184  As 
a result, those statements do not appear to share the premise of the liquidation approach, as 
understood by scholars like Professor Nelson, that the initial post-Founding generation was 
delegated the authority to fix constitutional meaning.  Instead, the statements in those decisions 
suggest that meaning would become fixed only if later generations continued to accept the early 
interpretation.  The idea of fixation through longstanding acceptance of a practice, however, is 
fully consistent with a historical gloss approach to constitutional interpretation, as we explained 
in Part II. 
 In sum, originalist scholars like Nelson succeed in distinguishing liquidation from gloss 
by arguing that the initial liquidation fixes constitutional meaning forever absent a 
constitutional amendment.  That approach is genuinely distinct from gloss, which does not insist 
on permanent fixation through practice and, relatedly, does not privilege early practice when it 
conflicts with longstanding subsequent practice.  Indeed, the Burkean consequentialist, 
decisional capacity, and deference justifications for gloss, outlined above in Section II.B, 
suggest that, if anything, durable modern practices should be privileged over earlier ones 
(because, for example, those who have engaged in the modern practices are closer to 
contemporary conditions and problems).  As we have explained, however, those very 
distinctions between the narrow account of liquidation and gloss render liquidation normatively 
problematic. 
B.  The Broader Account: Gloss by Another Name? 
1.  The Broader Account of Liquidation.  In a recent article, another originalist scholar, 
Professor Will Baude, seeks to “reconstruct[] James Madison’s theory of post-enactment 
historical practice, sometimes called ‘liquidation.’”185  According to Baude, that theory had 
three elements.  First, the text of the Constitution had to be indeterminate with respect to the 
question at issue.186  If a textual provision was clear, there was no occasion for liquidation.  
Second, government officials had to engage in a course of deliberate practice.187  That element 
required repeated decisions or actions, not just one decision or action.  Moreover, such repeated 
decisions or actions had to include reasoning about the constitutional question at issue, not 
simply decisions or actions publicly justified with whatever reasons, such as argumentation 
                                               
nothing short of a practical construction, long continued, of the constitutional provisions respecting their powers, 
and therefore should be taken as fixing the meaning of those provisions, if otherwise doubtful.”); Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (quoted supra note 21); Stuart v Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (quoted 
supra note 21).  Although the Court in Stuart v. Laird referenced acquiescence only for a period of several years, 
it is worth remembering that there were not many years to speak of in 1803. 
184 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2594 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
185 Baude, supra note 28, at 4. 
186 Id. at 13–16. 
187 Id. at 16–18. 
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about the policy wisdom or political expediency of the decisions or actions—although, Baude 
adds, such constitutional reasoning did not have to be genuine.188  Third, the accretion of 
practice must have resulted in a settlement of the constitutional question.189  That final element 
required both acquiescence by the dissenting side and “the public sanction,” which referred to 
“a real or imputed popular ratification” of the political settlement.190 
According to Baude, Madison’s theory of liquidation “look[s] to the most recent settled 
practice rather than privileging early practice or the first fixed practice.”191  Because past 
liquidations are not necessarily or characteristically permanent, Baude’s account of liquidation 
is broader than Nelson’s.192  Baude nonetheless resists the conclusion that his account is not 
“meaningfully distinct” from the historical gloss approach, reasoning that “liquidation has both 
a different pedigree and a different theoretical apparatus and so it therefore seems to diverge 
from (or add to) the ‘gloss’ project in at least three ways.”193  The first way is “a different 
attitude toward the constitutional text.”194  Whereas “[i]n liquidation, one must first ascertain 
that the constitutional text is indeterminate,” Justice Frankfurter “implies that he envisions 
looking to practice first and text second, rather than the other way around.”195  Moreover, Baude 
suggests that the two of us in other writings “do not appear to view ambiguity as a hard 
boundary in the same way that liquidation does.”196 
Second, according to Baude, “[l]iquidation . . . requires that the course of practice be 
the result of constitutional deliberation—and hence more than just silence.”197  By contrast, he 
writes, “Frankfurter’s gloss focused on what those in power have actually done. . . . Actions 
speak louder than words.” 198   Third, and switching from divergences between gloss and 
liquidation to a way in which liquidation adds to the gloss approach, Baude responds to the 
observation by one of us (referenced in Part II) that historical gloss is actually a cluster of 
different approaches that reflects different justifications for adhering to an accretion of political 
                                               
188 Id. at 48 n.290 (“The ultimate question for liquidation is not whether the government officials really 
believed in the constitutional arguments they articulated, but rather whether their interpretations reflected the 
public sanction.”). 
189 Id. at 18–21. 
190 Id. at 1; see id. at 19–20.  Madison referenced “the public sanction” in an 1830 letter to Martin L. 
Hurlbut.  See Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut (reprinted as Hurlbert) (May 1, 1830), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 370–72 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
191 Baude, supra note 28, at 63. 
192 See also Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1745, 1774 
(2015) (“Presumably, this ‘fixing’ [through liquidation] is not irrevocable, but, as in the case of precedent, 
departures require substantial justification and a similar process of deliberation and widespread acceptance.”).  
193 Baude, supra note 28, at 63–64. 
194 Id. at 64. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. (citing Bradley, supra note 19, at 830 n.317, and quoting Bradley & Siegel, supra note 44, at 1241–
42). 
197 Baude, supra note 28, at 64.  
198 Id. 
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branch practice.  “[I]t is possible,” he writes, “that liquidation is actually a specific kind of 
gloss, whose specific rules relate to its specific justifications.”199 
2.  Problems with the Broader Account of Liquidation.  We will address below whether 
either Baude’s broader account of liquidation or Nelson’s narrow account is properly attributed 
to Madison.  Here we observe that Baude’s account, by looking to the most recently settled 
practice as opposed to the first fixed practice, is less vulnerable to the normative criticisms 
discussed above in evaluating Nelson’s account.  But Baude reduces the force of those 
criticisms by diminishing the distinction between liquidation and gloss.  Moreover, the 
differences that remain—which concern liquidation’s requirements that the course of practice 
be the result of constitutional deliberation and that the public approve a proposed settlement—
are themselves vulnerable to substantial objections. 
 Contrary to what Baude suggests, gloss and liquidation do not necessarily imply a 
different attitude toward the constitutional text.  Both accept that constitutional text that is 
perceived to be clear is controlling even when there is contrary historical practice.  Justice 
Frankfurter said as much in part of his canonical formulation,200 and to the extent that he 
implied otherwise in another part,201 it matters more what the modern Court has done in using 
the historical gloss approach, as well as what commentators have argued in defending such 
use.202  As discussed in Part II, the Court in Noel Canning invoked historical practice only after 
concluding that the relevant portions of the text of the Recess Appointments Clause were 
unclear. 203   And while we have argued that perceptions of textual clarity in American 
interpretive practice are themselves affected in part by various non-textual factors, including 
historical practice, that is a descriptive claim and is not inherent in the gloss approach.204  In 
addition, as discussed in the next Part, it is originalists attracted to the concept of liquidation 
who describe the Constitution as indeterminate (and so amenable to fixation by practice) on the 
                                               
199 Id. at 65. 
200 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation . . 
. .”).  
201 Id. (“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning to the words of 
a text or supply them.”). 
202 The modern Supreme Court’s most famous rejection of a gloss argument was in INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919 (1983), where the Court held that a “legislative veto” provision was unconstitutional despite a 
longstanding congressional practice of including such provisions in legislation, in large part because the Court 
perceived the relevant constitutional text to be clear.  See id. at 945 (“Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the 
Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative 
process.”). 
203 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
204 See generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 44.  But cf. David A. Strauss, Foreword:  Does the 
Constitution Mean What it Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (“Adhering to the text would require us to 
relinquish many of the most important and well-established principles of constitutional law.”).  For an argument 
that it is more difficult to “know” the meaning of statutory text in high-stakes situations and that this difficulty 
helps explain the tendency of courts to treat the text more loosely in such cases, see Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes 
Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523 (2018). 
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question of the constitutionality of a national bank,205 the issue regarding which “Madison 
implemented the principles of liquidation . . . most thoroughly.”206  It is also such originalists 
who ascribe a perception of indeterminacy to Madison and to Chief Justice John Marshall,207 
even though—as detailed below—each argued vigorously and confidently in favor of their 
respective views of the bank’s constitutionality.208 
Perhaps the disagreement that Baude senses between scholars who tend to favor gloss 
and scholars who tend to favor liquidation is not a different attitude toward the constitutional 
text but rather a different attitude toward “the Constitution.”209  Interpreters most likely to be 
attracted to liquidation might understand the Constitution as consisting only of the original 
meaning of the text.  On that view, liquidation would be part of constitutional construction, 
which becomes permissible when the text is indeterminate, but not part of the Constitution.  
Interpreters most likely to be attracted to gloss, by contrast, might have a more expansive view 
of what qualifies as the Constitution, understanding it to include materials in addition to the 
original meaning of the text.210  Any such difference, however, likely stems not from any 
inherent differences between liquidation and gloss, but from differences in the interpreters who 
tend to be attracted to one theory or the other.  After all, historical practice standing alone is not 
considered part of the Constitution itself under either liquidation or gloss.211  And gloss, like 
liquidation, is compatible with the idea of constitutional construction.212  Moreover, while it is 
true that gloss might inform inferences about the constitutional structure as well as the 
interpretation of specific textual provisions,213 many originalist judges and scholars supplement 
their originalism with structural argumentation,214 and it is not clear why liquidation would be 
inapplicable to such argumentation.  In short, some versions of originalism could accept gloss, 
and some versions of non-originalism could accept liquidation.215 
                                               
205 See, e.g., Baude, supra note 28, at 21–29. 
206 See id. at 21. 
207 See, e.g., id. at 24–25. 
208 See infra Part IV. 
209 For a recent study of the evolution in thinking about “the Constitution” during the decade after its 
adoption, see generally GIENAPP, supra note 29. 
210 Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 3 (“Examination of political efforts to construct constitutional 
meaning reveals that the governing Constitution is a synthesis of legal doctrines, institutional practices, and 
political norms.”). 
211 See supra Part II (discussing our approach to gloss). 
212 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 425–26. 
213 See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 19, at 276–78. 
214  See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (structural principle of equal state 
sovereignty); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (anti-commandeering principle). 
215 There might be even more fundamental differences between originalists and non-originalists about the 
meaning of “law”—for example, about the extent to which law encompasses consequentialist as well as formal 
elements, an issue that connects to philosophical debates about legal positivism.  Cf. Sachs, supra note 54, at 833 
(“The originalist and the pluralist simply disagree on which sources [of law] matter.”).  But, again, such differences 
do not seem intrinsic to the debate between liquidation and gloss.  
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Professor Baude’s second attempt to distinguish his broader account of liquidation from 
the historical gloss approach fares better.  Whereas Professor Baude’s account would always 
require the course of practice to be the consequence of constitutional deliberation about the 
question at issue, gloss (as explained in Part II) need not rest on the idea that it reflects an 
agreement between the two political branches about questions of constitutionality.  Gloss can 
additionally or alternatively rest on risk-averse Burkean arguments about what has worked at 
least tolerably well, about stability, and about reliance interests.216  Such considerations may be 
deemed important when the practice has not been overly controversial and has enjoyed 
bipartisan participation, and also when it may be impossible to know all of the ways in which 
the practice reflects compromises and accommodations over time, such that one should be wary 
about attempts to pull on one component of the compromises or accommodations in isolation.  
In addition, as also discussed in Part II, gloss can rest on considerations of decisional capacity, 
which in some instances will mean that longstanding governmental practices provide the most 
defensible interpretive material regardless of whether they are found to reflect inter-branch 
constitutional agreement. 
 Both descriptively and normatively, it counts in favor of the gloss approach and against 
Professor Baude’s account of liquidation that the justifications for crediting gloss include not 
only deference to the constitutional judgments of government officials, but also Burkean 
consequentialism and considerations of decisional capacity.  As a realist matter, such 
considerations almost certainly affect the constitutional reasoning of most judges and 
commentators,217 and the gloss approach is more transparent than Professor Baude’s liquidation 
account about that aspect of interpretive practice.  Statements like the following from INS v. 
Chadha may be true in a sense, but they are incomplete as accounts of our constitutional 
practice: 
[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in 
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is 
contrary to the Constitution.  Convenience and efficiency are not the primary 
objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government, and our inquiry is 
sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are 
appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to 
executive and independent agencies . . . .218 
It is true that efficiency, convenience, and usefulness do not supersede “the Constitution,” and 
Chadha appears to have been a case in which the Court thought that the meaning of the 
constitutional text was clear, rendering resort to historical practice inappropriate.  But functional 
concerns and historical practice do play an important role in discerning the constitutional 
separation of powers when the constitutional text and structure are not perceived to be clear.  
Relatedly, rhetoric to the effect that “we protect the Constitution even if it causes the heavens 
to fall” is likely to be somewhat disingenuous, or at least unrealistic, which is why it is 
                                               
216 See Bradley, supra note 19, at 66–67. 
217 See generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 44. 
218 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). 
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extraordinarily rare to find judges or commentators who think that enforcement of their own 
understanding of the Constitution would actually cause the heavens to fall. 
 Normatively, it seems too restrictive—and would likely prove destabilizing—always to 
require a strong showing of an inter-branch agreement or settlement about the meaning of the 
Constitution before historical practice could be credited in constitutional interpretation.  As 
discussed in Section II.B, a number of important and longstanding government practices, 
relating to both domestic and foreign affairs, in the fields of both constitutional law and federal 
courts, do not clearly reflect any inter-branch agreement about constitutional meaning and yet 
have become well-accepted aspects of our constitutional practice.  Moreover, it is not certain 
that early nineteenth-century political branch practice with respect to the national bank satisfies 
Baude’s criteria, given that constitutional opposition to the bank survived McCulloch219 and 
culminated in the rejection by the popular (and populist) President Andrew Jackson of both the 
bank and Madison’ position that the constitutional question had been settled by practice.220   
 There is an additional way in which Baude distinguishes his broader account of 
liquidation from the historical gloss approach, although he does not take note of the difference.  
According to Baude, the liquidation process is not complete until the public directly or 
indirectly approves one proposed political settlement over others.221  He never explains what 
counts as direct or indirect public approval and so how to discern it, but that requirement does 
seem distinct from accounts of historical gloss, which focus exclusively on the actions, 
inactions, and decisions of government officials, not on the approval of the general public.  
 Always requiring (and so having to detect) public approval of a political settlement 
before it can count as fixing the meaning of the Constitution for a time seems to us both 
unrealistic and normatively problematic.  It is hard enough to use historical practice in a 
principled fashion when focusing only on the conduct and arguments of government officials. 
Discerning when “the public” has blessed the settlement seems a hopeless task: without some 
way of knowing which proposed settlements the public has or has not approved, that 
requirement seems impossible to operationalize.  For example, as just discussed, Baude notes 
President Jackson’s reasons for disagreeing with Madison about whether the issue of the 
constitutionality of a national bank had been settled, but Baude offers no way of adjudicating 
the disagreement between them.222 
In addition, as Baude notes, “liquidation can happen on mundane constitutional 
questions that do not attract much public notice.”223  If constitutional issues do not attract much 
public attention, it is not clear how “the public sanction” can be forthcoming.  For example, 
                                               
219 See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824) (rejecting an attempt by an Ohio 
official in effect to relitigate McCulloch).   
220 See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 576–89 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896); see also Baude, supra note 
28, at 28–29 (discussing that episode).   
221 See Baude, supra note 28, at 19–20. 
222 See id. at 27–29. 
223 See id. at 66. 
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Baude observes that Justice Joseph Story failed to understand the subtlety of certain of 
Madison’s constitutionally conscientious maneuvers during spending debates in Congress.224  
Baude does not explain how the less engaged, and less discerning, mass public could have 
figured out what Madison was up to.  
Moreover, even when constitutional issues do attract public attention, the engaged 
public will rarely reach consensus on a given question.  That is especially true in circumstances 
of cultural conflict or political polarization, which have existed for much of American history, 
and certainly exist today.  The requisite percentage of the public that needs to sanction a 
settlement remains a mystery.  
Requiring public approval also seems normatively undesirable, at least much of the 
time.  Baude does not defend requiring “the public sanction” except to the extent he is making 
an originalist argument grounded in Madison’s own views.  He expressly disclaims making 
such an originalist argument,225 even as he seems to imply throughout his article that his account 
of liquidation is justified by originalism and Madisonian “pedigree.”226  In any event, requiring 
public approval makes little sense with respect to many constitutional issues (such as the 
meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause or the scope of the President’s authority to 
recognize foreign governments), regarding which the mass public will not be directly informed 
or engaged.  Relatedly, Baude does not address whether liquidation is, like gloss, relevant to 
illuminating structural principles of constitutional law in addition to resolving indeterminacies 
in specific textual provisions; if so, it becomes even more uncertain how a public sanction 
requirement would make sense given the public’s relative lack of awareness of structural 
principles. 
Finally, whereas most defenses of gloss have focused on the separation of powers for 
the reasons discussed in Section II.C, liquidation under Baude’s account potentially applies to 
all issues of constitutional law, including federalism and individual rights controversies.  
Although Baude does not take a definitive position on the question of liquidation’s domain, he 
notes that “[a]ny provision of the Constitution can be indeterminate.”227  He also observes that 
the controversy over the national bank, which he describes as “the archetypical example of 
liquidation,” involved an issue of federalism.228  And while he acknowledges some difficulties 
associated with fitting “Madison’s model” to individual rights cases, he also observes in favor 
of such a fit that “Founding-era thought” may not have understood individual rights as 
                                               
224 See id. at 32.  Madison was worried that federal spending on sympathetic causes would set legislative 
precedents for an unconstitutionally broad spending power, so he sought to reframe certain instances of such 
spending as tax breaks or partial repayments of debts.  See id at 29–32. 
225 See id. at 4 (“This focus on Madison is expository and conceptual, not dictated either by history or 
constitutional law.”); id. at 35–47 (grounding liquidation partly in departmentalism, precedent, and tradition). 
226  See id. at 6, 32–33, 35, 50, 64, 65 (expressly or impliedly invoking originalism or Madisonian 
“pedigree” as normative justification for liquidation).  Relatedly, in presenting the elements of his theory of 
liquidation, Baude repeatedly associates them with statements by Madison and yet avoids committing to having 
described what could genuinely be described as Madison’s own theory, see id. at 14, leaving the reader uncertain 
at times about precisely what work Madison is doing in the article.  For further discussion, see infra Part IV. 
227 Id. at 49. 
228 Id. 
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countermajoritarian; that the line between constitutional structure and individual rights is often 
blurred; and that the “public sanction” element of liquidation may render the concept suitable 
for individual rights issues.229  As we discussed in Section II.C, however, there are serious 
questions about the normative desirability of relying on historical practice to resolve 
constitutional issues outside of the area of separation of powers, particularly in the domain of 
individual rights.  Baude does not address those questions. 
IV.  MADISON’S THEORY? 
Originalist scholars who offer a narrow account of liquidation, like Nelson, argue that 
they are discerning Madison’s views on the role of historical practice in constitutional 
construction.  So does Baude in developing his broader account.  Because the narrow and 
broader accounts offer partially inconsistent interpretations of Madison’s thought, they cannot 
both be right to claim the mantle of Madison.  We are not persuaded that either, in its entirety, 
is properly attributed to Madison, but the broader account seems to us somewhat closer to the 
historical mark.  Having said that, we do not think Baude has established that Madison worked 
out anything like the systematic, three-part “theory” of liquidation that Baude outlines. 
Before beginning, it is worth asking why, exactly, originalists such as Nelson and Baude 
are so eager to equate their ideas with Madison—why they seek, in effect, to liquidate 
liquidation through Madison.  Because they otherwise reject the idea that originalism can self-
justify, they sometimes suggest that they are reconstructing Madison’s thinking concerning 
liquidation merely because his ideas merely help illuminate a key question that would be 
important and valuable regardless of whether he happened to endorse it.  On the other hand, in 
attempting to link liquidation specifically with Madison, a Founder and one of the central 
architects of the Constitution, they appear to be seeking to give the theory an originalist pedigree 
(and, as noted above, Baude in fact repeatedly invokes the theory’s purported pedigree).  
Implicitly, those theorists seem to be suggesting that fixation through practice may be 
compatible with originalism only if it can be made part of the “Founding,” with all the 
intellectual and cultural weight that accompanies that designation.    
Whatever the reason for focusing on Madison, in order to understand what he was 
getting at in Federalist No. 37, it is necessary to put his reference to liquidation in context.  That 
Federalist essay responds to Anti-Federalist criticisms that much of the language of the 
proposed Constitution was indeterminate.  Madison replied by emphasizing the extraordinary 
difficulties that the Framers had confronted in attempting to draft a new framework of 
government.  He noted that federalism was a novel constitutional arrangement, so that the 
Framers had scant previous experience from which to draw.230  He added that the Constitutional 
Convention faced great challenges even in the area of separation of powers, where previous 
experience was more substantial.231  “Among the difficulties encountered by the convention,” 
Madison explained, “a very important one must have lain in combining the requisite stability 
and energy in government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican 
                                               
229 Id. at 50. 
230 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (Madison), at 226, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 158. 
231 Id. at 228. 
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form.”232  In emphasizing the Herculean nature of those efforts, Madison pointed to the long 
experience of Great Britain in attempting to work out differences in categories of law and 
jurisdiction, a process that he noted was still ongoing.233  He then made the statement about 
liquidation.234 
Liquidation was required, Madison wrote, for three reasons.  The first was “the obscurity 
arising from the complexity of objects” needing to be distinguished, including the distinction 
between federal and state power, and the lines separating the executive, legislative, and judicial 
authorities.235  The second reason concerned “the imperfections of the human faculties,” which 
make it even more difficult to perceive those objects.236  The third reason involved the limits of 
language, which Madison characterized as “inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas.”237  “Hence, 
it must happen,” Madison wrote, “that however accurately objects may be discriminated in 
themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of 
them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered.”238  As 
Madison must have known, none of those justifications would ever disappear, even after what 
he referred to as “particular discussions and adjudications” took place in the early years of life 
under the new Constitution—or even many decades hence.239  For example, just after recording 
his observation about the limited extent to which any use of language can convey determinate 
meaning, Madison wrote that “[w]hen the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind 
in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by 
the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.”240  Federalist No. 37 is deeply skeptical 
of the determinacy of human language:  when speaking through such language, not even God 
can write determinately, Madison was saying. 
Recall also that Madison referred both to practice and to judicial decisions as involved 
in liquidation.241  It seems unlikely, however, that he was referring only to initial judicial 
                                               
232 Id. at 226. 
233 Id. at 228. 
234 Id. at 228–29. 
235 Id. at 229. 
236 Id.  
237 Id.  
238 Id.  
239 Id.  
240 Id.  Cf. GIENAPP, supra note 29, at 110–11 (“At no point during ratification did any participant offer a 
more sophisticated account of language, its inherent complexities, and the peculiar problems it posed for written 
constitutionalism.”).  
241 See McConnell, supra note 192, at 1776 (“The rationale for liquidation by longstanding practice of 
democratically accountable bodies is mostly the same as—but more democratic than—the rationale for liquidation 
by judicial precedent.  Madison referred to both forms of liquidation in the same breath.”); Peter J. Smith, The 
Marshall Court and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. REV. 612, 634 (2006) (“That Madison believed that 
congressional deliberation or popular action could fix constitutional meaning does not mean that he rejected the 
notion that the courts could fix it in appropriate cases, as well.  Indeed, his discussion in The Federalist No. 37 and 
in other sources suggests that he saw both as viable means of liquidating the meaning of constitutional 
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decisions, because it would not have been reasonable to expect all—or even most—issues of 
textual indeterminacy to be resolved by the courts in the immediate aftermath of the 
Constitution’s ratification, or even over the Constitution’s first century.  Given the common 
law tradition that Madison referenced in Federalist No. 37, it is also unlikely that he thought 
that a judicial decision would fix constitutional meaning in a way that would disallow 
subsequent reconsideration of the decision.  There are differing accounts of how strongly the 
Founders conceived of stare decisis, but none of those accounts suggests that they thought 
judicial decisions could never be revisited absent an Article V amendment.242 
For those reasons, Madison need not be read in Federalist No. 37 as suggesting either 
that initial practice would freeze the meaning of the Constitution going forward or that only 
such practice was relevant to constitutional interpretation.  Instead, as historian Jack Rakove 
notes, Madison can reasonably be understood as referring broadly to “the ongoing process of 
resolving ‘obscure and equivocal’ ambiguities through ‘particular discussions and 
adjudications’—in a word, interpretation.”243  Such a process of interpretation logically would 
include frequent consideration of practice long after the Founding.  As Rakove points out, “only 
knowledge created by intervening developments could supply the ‘want of antecedent 
experience’ felt by the framers.”244 
To be sure, Madison did tell his colleagues in the first Congress that their decision 
regarding the power of the President to remove executive branch officers unilaterally “will 
become the permanent exposition of the Constitution.”245  Although Madison may well have 
believed as a normative matter that future interpreters should give the decision weight, his 
reference to permanence here can simply be read either as an effort to focus his colleagues’ 
attention on the importance of the issue or as a prediction of the probable precedential and path-
dependent consequences of the decision (he used the word “will,” not “should”).  Madison 
surely knew that whether it would in fact “become the permanent exposition of the 
Constitution” would depend on whether future interpreters would accept the decision as 
authoritative.  In that regard, it is noteworthy that Congress subsequently insisted on a greater 
                                               
ambiguities.”).  The same can be said of Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78, which specifically references the 
courts.  See supra note 159 (quoting that essay). 
242 See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the 
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1999); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 58, at 809–23; Lee J. Strang, 
An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. 
REV. 419 (2006); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723, 757 (1988) (“In the American common law, stare decisis states a conditional obligation: precedent binds 
absent a showing of substantial countervailing considerations.”).  
243 RAKOVE, supra note 127, at 159 (emphasis in original).  See also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 910 (1985) (“Madison’s argument, which Hamilton had 
anticipated in The Federalist No. 22, was of course a restatement in somewhat abstract terms, of the old common 
law assumption, shared by the Philadelphia framers, that the ‘intent’ of any legal document is the product of the 
interpretive process and not some fixed meaning that the author locks into the document’s text at the outset.”). 
244 RAKOVE, supra note 127, at 159. See also Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 110 (1998) (interpreting Madison to mean that “[e]arly and continued practice” 
would serve as “a check on (but not an invariable barrier to) subsequent reinterpretation”). 
245 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 514 (1789).  For a description of different scholarly views about what, if anything, 
was actually agreed upon in this “Decision of 1789,” see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 477. 
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role in the removal process, and the Supreme Court, despite resisting some of those efforts in 
Myers v. United States,246 ultimately has allowed Congress the ability to limit presidential 
removal of a variety of officials.247  Normatively, moreover, it seems like an overreading to 
replace what Madison actually said with words to the effect that the decision of the first 
Congress regarding the President’s authority to remove executive branch officers unilaterally 
“should become the permanent exposition of the Constitution no matter what the future may 
hold.” 
As noted above, another example commonly cited as evidence of Madison’s embrace 
of the liquidation idea is his shift in public position concerning the constitutionality of a national 
bank.  In December 1790, Alexander Hamilton submitted a plan for a national bank that would 
be chartered by Congress.  Madison, who had been elected to the first Congress from Virginia, 
opened the debate in the House by declaring emphatically that the bank was beyond the scope 
of Congress’s enumerated powers.248  By 1815, however, Madison was now President, and in 
vetoing on policy grounds a bill to reauthorize the bank, he  
[w]aiv[ed] the question of the constitutional authority of the Legislature to 
establish an incorporated bank as being precluded in my judgment by repeated 
recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution in 
acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, 
accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general 
will of the nation.249   
In that veto message, Madison did not appear to be saying that initial practice had fixed the 
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause for all time absent a formal amendment.  Instead, 
he seemed to be suggesting that, because the political branches and the general public had long 
agreed that the bank was constitutional, he no longer felt entitled as President to insist on his 
own private opinion of the constitutional text, original understanding, and constitutional 
structure in considering whether to sign the bill into law.  Such a view is consistent with 
historical gloss, as is his analogy to judicial precedent in subsequent correspondence discussing 
the issue.250  It is also worth keeping in mind that, in his veto message, Madison was speaking 
as an elected statesman responsible for considering the overall national interest, an institutional 
position that may reflect considerations that will not necessarily carry over to other interpretive 
contexts. 
                                               
246 272 U.S. 52 (1926).  
247 See, e.g., Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654 (1988).  
248 James Madison’s Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb 2, 1791), in JAMES MADISON: 
WRITINGS 480-90 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) [hereinafter “Madison, Bank Speech”].  
249  James Madison, Veto Message on the National Bank (Jan 30, 1815), at 
http://millercenter.org/president/madison/speeches/speech-3626.  See also Richard S. Arnold, How James 
Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 286–90 (1997).  
250  See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), at 
https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEA-print-02-02-02-2374 (analogizing to 
judicial deference to precedent).  
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Just as importantly, even if Madison had been suggesting that post-Founding practices 
and beliefs had fixed the meaning of the Constitution in favor of the permissibility of the bank, 
it would not have been an example of liquidation as that concept has been described by scholars 
such as Nelson and Baude.  The liquidation concept posits that certain issues of constitutional 
meaning were left unresolved at the Founding because the constitutional text was indeterminate 
with respect to them.  Madison, however, never believed that the meaning of the Constitution 
was indeterminate with respect to the permissibility of a national bank, which is why he argued 
so forcefully against its constitutionality in the first Congress—and why, as Baude himself 
observes, Madison wrote in an 1831 letter to Charles Haynes that his “abstract opinion of the 
text of the Constitution is not changed.”251  Throughout his career in public life, he continued 
to believe that the Constitution supported his previous view.252  He also suggested that, if it had 
been known at the time of the Founding that the Supreme Court would adopt the broad 
reasoning in McCulloch in support of the constitutionality of the bank, the Constitution might 
not have been ratified.253  But because too many other institutions and individuals had disagreed 
with him over an extended period of time, he “‘did not feel [him]self, as a public man, at liberty 
to sacrifice all these public considerations to [his] private opinion.’”254  In other words, in what 
is cited as the most significant example of Madison’s purported theory of liquidation, it is not 
even clear that Madison viewed it in those terms.255 
Baude hedges in suggesting that Madison thought the Constitution was indeterminate 
on the question of the bank’s constitutionality,256 and he offers little supporting evidence.  He 
relies upon Madison’s statement in the House opposing the first bank bill that “[t]he doctrine 
of implication is always a tender one,”257 as well as Madison’s references to interpretive rules 
for “controverted” or “doubtful” cases.258  Those few utterances, however, do not establish that 
                                               
251 See Baude, supra note 28, at 25 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Charles E. Haynes (Feb. 25, 
1831), reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 164, 165 (1865)).   
252 See Powell, supra note 243, at 940 (“His own ‘abstract opinion of the text’ remained unchanged: the 
words of the Constitution did not authorize Congress to establish the bank.”) (quoting Letter from Madison to 
Haynes, supra note 251).  
253 See Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), supra note 158 (“But it was 
anticipated, I believe, by few if any of the friends of the Constitution, that a rule of construction would be 
introduced, as broad and as pliant as what has occurred. Those who recollect, and still more, those who shared in 
what passed in the State Conventions, thro’ which the people ratified the Constitution, with respect to the extent 
of the powers vested in Congress, can not easily be persuaded that the avowal of such a rule would not have 
prevented its ratification.”). 
254 Powell, supra note 243, at 940 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Marquis de LaFayette (Nov. 
1826), reprinted in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 538, 542 (1865)). 
255  See also Sandy Levinson, Our Inevitably Living Constitution, BALKINIZATION, Oct. 23, 2018, 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/10/our-inevitably-living-constitution.html (“[Madison] never for an instant 
admitted that he had been mistaken in his 1791 opposition to the Bank, only that it was time in effect to move 
on.”). 
256 Baude, supra note 28, at 25 (“Indeed, for all of Madison’s forceful condemnation of the bank in his 
1791 speech in Congress, he also seemed to admit that the question was sufficiently indeterminate as to require 
such construction.”) (emphases added).   
257 See id. (quoting Madison, Bank Speech, supra note 248, at 486).  
258 See Baude, supra note 28, at 25 (quoting Madison, Bank Speech, supra note 248, at 482).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331588 
 49 
Madison perceived indeterminacy, and the overwhelming thrust of the speech in which they 
appear suggests otherwise.  
After discussing the policy merits of the bank bill, Madison turned to its 
constitutionality, emphasizing his personal knowledge of the fact that the Constitutional 
Convention had decided against giving Congress the power to charter corporations.259  He then 
argued both that there was an attenuated link between federal power to charter a corporation 
and any enumerated power, and that the creation of a corporation was “a great and important 
power,” which meant that such a power, in order to exist at the federal level, had to be listed 
separately in Article I, Section 8; it could not be left to implication.260  Baude himself explains 
Madison’s argument when he writes that, in Madison’s view, “to satisfy the Constitution the 
bank must be both ‘necessary to the end, and incident to the nature’ of the underlying 
enumerated powers, and the bank was neither.”261  And rather than suggest that he was offering 
a canon of construction in the face of indeterminacy, Madison grounded his argument in the 
Constitution: “The latitude of interpretation required by the bill is condemned by the rule 
furnished by the constitution itself.” 262   Madison’s summation of his argument similarly 
expressed no doubt and grounded his argument in the Constitution: 
It appeared on the whole, he concluded, that the power exercised by the bill was 
condemned by the silence of the constitution; was condemned by the rule of 
interpretation arising out of the constitution; was condemned by its tendency to 
destroy the main characteristic of the constitution; was condemned by the 
expositions of the friends of the constitution, whilst depending before the public; 
was condemned by apparent intention of the parties which ratified the 
constitution; was condemned by the explanatory amendments proposed by 
Congress themselves to the Constitution; and he hoped it would receive its final 
condemnation, by the vote of this house.263  
In light of the above evidence, it does not appear that Madison thought the meaning of the 
Constitution with respect to the permissibility of the national bank needed to be “liquidated.”264 
                                               
259 Madison, Bank Speech, supra note 248, at 482 (“[H]e had reserved to himself, he said, the right to 
deny the authority of Congress to pass [the bank bill].  He had entertained this opinion from the date of the 
constitution. His impression might perhaps be the stronger, because he well recollected that a power to grant 
charters of incorporation had been proposed in the general convention and rejected.”).  
260 See id. at 487 (arguing that examples drawn from the text of the Constitution “condemn the exercise 
of any power, particularly a great and important power, which is not evidently and necessarily involved in an 
express power”).   
261 Baude, supra note 28, at 21–22 (quoting Madison’s Bank Speech, supra note 248, at 484).   
262 Madison’s Bank Speech, supra note 248, at 486. 
263 Id. at 490.   
264 Accord Levinson, supra note 255 (“By the time he was opposing the Bank of the United States 
promoted by his former ally, and now bitter enemy, Alexander Hamilton, the Constitution was becoming less 
‘cloudy’ and, Madison alleged, clearly adverse to Congress’s power to charter the Bank.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331588 
 50 
Much the same can be said in response to Baude’s argument that Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion for the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland265 “also hit the key elements of 
liquidation.”266  In the opening passage of the opinion, Marshall discussed the historical practice 
concerning the first and second banks and stated that such practice supported the second bank’s 
constitutionality.267  That discussion, although a noteworthy invocation of historical practice, 
was brief and was not the opinion’s central rationale, as Marshall himself indicated.268  His 
opinion in McCulloch has not been understood to reflect Madisonian liquidation in the face of 
textual indeterminacy.  Instead, his opinion has long been understood primarily to reflect 
structural reasoning269: the federal government is supreme within its sphere of action,270 and if 
an end is within the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers (its sphere of action), then so are 
all convenient or useful means.271  Indeed, Marshall had already decided that Congress had the 
power to create the bank by the time he got around to examining the language of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.272  Moreover, in holding for the Court that states lacked the power to tax the 
bank, Marshall also employed structural reasoning, emphasizing that a part of the Union may 
not tax the whole because the whole is not represented in the part;273 he expressly stated that 
there was no textual provision on point.274 
                                               
265 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819).   
266 Baude, supra note 28, at 24.   
267 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 197–98.   
268 Id. at 198 (“These observations belong to the cause; but they are not made under the impression, that, 
were the question entirely new, the law would be found irreconcilable with the constitution.”).   
269 See BLACK, supra note 136, at 13–15 (interpreting McCulloch as a structural opinion). 
270 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 199 (“If any one proposition could command the universal assent of 
mankind, we might expect it would be this—that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is 
supreme within its sphere of action.”). 
271 See id. at 200 (“But it may with great reason be contended, that a government, intrusted with such 
ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must 
also be intrusted with ample means for their execution.”). 
272 See id. at 202 (“But the constitution of the United States has not left the right of congress to employ 
the necessary means, for the execution of the powers conferred on the government, to general reasoning. To its 
enumeration of powers is added, that of making ‘all laws which shall be necessary and proper . . . . ’”).   
273 See id. at 429 (articulating the “intelligible standard” that the states’ power of taxation extends only to 
“all subjects over which the sovereign power of a State extends”).  For a discussion, see FARBER & SIEGEL, supra 
note 100, at 96–99. 
274  After noting the absence of textual authority, Marshall drew inferences from the constitutional 
structure: 
[T]he counsel for the bank place its claim to be exempted from the power of a state to tax its 
operations. There is no express provision for the case, but the claim has been sustained on a 
principle which so entirely pervades the constitution, is so intermixed with the materials which 
compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being 
separated from it, without rending it into shreds.  This great principle is, that the constitution and 
the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of 
the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them.  
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To be sure, Baude’s broader account of liquidation, by not limiting liquidation to the 
first fixed practice, appears to make better sense of Madison’s various statements than Nelson’s 
narrow account.  We are not persuaded, however, that Baude has rediscovered “James 
Madison’s theory of postenactment historical practice.”275  To our knowledge, no historian of 
Madison has discovered such a theory, and we are not convinced that there is one, at least not 
one that Madison had worked out in any systematic way.  Baude significantly understates the 
problem when he writes that the theory was “never quite systematically explained in a single 
place.”276  We are skeptical that a modern legal scholar, even one as talented as Baude, can 
develop an entire theoretical framework and call it Madison’s theory based on snippets from 
Madison’s Federalist essays, letters, and other materials, over the course of many years, during 
which time Madison’s own roles and views on the scope of federal power, the nature of the 
Constitution, and the practice of constitutional interpretation were changing significantly.277   
For example, we have no idea whether Madison would think that “the public sanction” 
should always be required for liquidation or gloss, even if Madison referred to such a sanction 
in some contexts.  More specifically, Madison never told us whether he thought public approval 
was required even with respect to constitutional questions that, unlike the longstanding debate 
over the first and second banks, did not attract much public attention.  We might be tempted to 
suggest that Madison was far too sensible a thinker to have thought such a thing, but in truth 
we would just be guessing as much as Baude appears to be guessing in suggesting otherwise.  
Notably, however, historian Jonathan Gienapp reads Madison as suggesting during the 1789 
debate over the removal of executive branch officers that recourse to “the people themselves, 
instantiated in some form,” as Gienapp puts it, “was not actually necessary.”278  Our best sense 
is that Madison never developed a clear account of what would be required to establish the 
“public sanction.”  He seemed convinced that the right sort of public approval could clarify or 
elaborate upon the meaning of the Constitution, but he did not seem able to explain exactly 
what that would mean in operation.  Madison’s unresolved difficulties in that regard not only 
suggest the unworkability of a public sanction requirement, but they also cast doubt more 
generally on the possibility of maintaining a strict version of liquidation, with an operative set 
of rules, of the sort championed by Nelson or Baude.    
                                               
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 208.  To be clear, Marshall himself may have viewed his structural reasoning as part of 
proper textual interpretation, as opposed to an alternative to it; our point is simply that such reasoning, rather than 
historical practice, was the central thrust of the opinion. 
275 Baude, supra note 28, at 4. 
276 Id. at 13. 
277 See GIENAPP, supra note 29, at 161–62, 209, 321–22, 327–32 (discussing the changes over time in 
Madison’s views on those subjects).  For other accounts documenting how Madison was in part a practicing 
politician who was not a model of consistency over time, see generally NOAH FELDMAN, THE THREE LIVES OF 
JAMES MADISON: GENIUS, PARTISAN, PRESIDENT (2017), and MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015).  For an argument that Madison developed his enumerated-powers 
objection late in the debate over the Bank and that the objection seemed to depart from his prior views about the 
Constitution, see Richard Primus, “The Essential Characteristic”:  Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United 
States, 117 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2018). 
278 GIENAPP, supra note 29, at 142. 
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Relatedly, Baude never critically examines Madison’s statements to probe them for 
consistency or coherency, or for whether they are really about liquidation per se.  To take one 
example, Madison’s statement to his colleagues in 1789 when debating the removal power that 
their decision would become the “permanent exposition of the Constitution”279  ostensibly 
contradicts Baude’s view of how liquidation works (because according to Baude, Madison 
thought that a liquidation is not necessarily permanent).  Baude tries to explain this 
inconsistency by simply noting that “[i]t might be the case that liquidation was expected to be 
permanent, but these expectations might not always come true.”280  Our view, as we noted 
above, is that in at least some of the statements that Baude cites, Madison was probably making 
a practical point rather than any point about constitutional theory.  When debating new issues 
(whether in a legislature or at a faculty meeting), people commonly talk about the need to be 
attentive to the precedent being set; that does not require a constitutional theory, let alone the 
liquidation theory as described by Baude.  The same can be said of Madison’s occasional 
warnings to colleagues about “establishing a dangerous precedent”281 in spending debates—
that is just a common observation to make when contemplating any new actions.  Baude’s 
effort, as he puts it, to “charitably reconstruct [Madison’s] theory of liquidation”282 relies on 
various statements by Madison that he may not have intended to reflect a theory.  If not, Baude’s 
account is not a reconstruction of Madison’s thought and so should not be confused with an 
originalist argument. 
Although Supreme Court Justices are neither historians nor Madison specialists, it is 
noteworthy that the majority in Noel Canning seemed to interpret some of Madison’s statements 
on liquidation as consistent with the historical gloss approach.  In explaining the propriety of 
looking to practice, the majority quoted a letter from Madison referring to liquidation, and then 
said that “our cases have continually confirmed Madison’s view.”283  As we noted in the 
Introduction, however, many of the decisions cited by the majority endorsed historical gloss.284  
Indeed, the majority specifically included in that set of citations Frankfurter’s concurrence in 
Youngstown.  The majority correctly described those precedents as “show[ing] that this Court 
has treated practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that 
practice is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era.”285  That 
statement is entirely consistent with the historical gloss approach.  Thus, the majority—
reasonably, we think—interpreted Madison’s reference to liquidation differently from how it 
has been interpreted by originalist scholars like Nelson and Baude.   
Of course, even if Madison was endorsing a worked-out theory of liquidation, it is not 
clear what implications that fact would or should have for interpreters today.  Nelson and Baude 
have not shown (and do not claim to have shown) that Madison’s views on that matter 
                                               
279 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 514 (1789).    
280 Baude, supra note 28, at 59. 
281 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 170–71 (1794).  
282 Baude, supra note 28, at 13. 
283 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560.   
284 See supra note 24.   
285 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560.   
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represented a general consensus of the Founders about how the Constitution should be 
interpreted (or “constructed”).286  Moreover, Gienapp has recently emphasized the lack of a 
Founding consensus about what the Constitution was or how it should be interpreted.287  But 
even if it could be shown that there was such a consensus, the implications would still be 
unclear, given (to reiterate) that originalism cannot prove originalism.  Originalists like Nelson 
and Baude seem to be trying to justify liquidation as originalist by tying it to Madison, while at 
the same time never quite claiming that such a connection would be sufficient. 
Granted, if one accepts a particular species of originalism known as “original methods” 
originalism, and if it is shown that liquidation is the approach that would have been used by the 
Founders, then liquidation might carry through with the commitment to originalism.288  But it 
is far from clear that the concept of liquidation is an original Founding method for interpreting 
and applying the Constitution, and, in any event, most originalists are not original methods 
originalists.  For most originalists, if they accept a role for post-Founding practice, it is because 
they accept the idea of “constitutional construction,” which is an enterprise that by definition is 
supposed to be distinct from “constitutional interpretation” and thus does not follow from the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  For such originalists, as well as of course for non-originalists, 
the normative differences between liquidation and gloss should matter. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 The U.S. Constitution is the oldest written constitution in the world, and it is also one 
of the most difficult to amend.  Relatively short, it cannot be said to “partake of the prolixity of 
a legal code.”289  In its original form, the Constitution was primarily a framework for a new 
national government, and its first three articles outline the structure and powers of the three 
federal branches.  For 230 years, the United States government has operated under that 
framework even as conditions have changed in ways beyond the Founders’ conceivable 
imaginations.  Over the course of American history, the institutions of the federal government 
have themselves played an important role in helping to fill in and clarify the framework through 
their practices and interactions, informed by the realities of governance.   
In recent years, legal scholars have become increasingly attentive to the constitutional 
role played by such governmental practice.  Theories of “historical gloss” in particular have 
highlighted the role of historical practice and attempted to situate it within constitutional theory.  
The U.S. Supreme Court, in recent decisions, has also emphasized such practice.  Although it 
is easier to accommodate a role for post-Founding practice within non-originalist approaches 
to constitutional interpretation, some originalist scholars have also sought to take account of at 
                                               
286 Scholars sometimes generalize too quickly from Madison’s views to the views of “the Framers” or 
“the Founders” or “the Founding generation” as a whole.  For a cautionary tale, see generally Larry D. Kramer, 
Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L .REV. 611 (1999). 
287 See generally GIENAPP, supra note 29. 
288 “Original methods originalism” is the view that interpreters today should apply the same methods of 
interpretation that the “enactors” of the Constitution would have employed.  See, in particular, McGinnis & 
Rappaport, supra note 43.  See also JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION chs. 7, 8 (2013). 
289 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
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least some of that practice, under the label “Madisonian liquidation.”  In this Article, we have 
explained the originalist turn to historical practice, described the historical gloss approach, 
compared gloss with liquidation, and suggested that the differences between those theories 
concerning the proper role of historical practice in constitutional interpretation render 
liquidation less normatively attractive than gloss. 
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